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I explore the implications of reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions. In the 
first part, I develop a Prospect theory based model to explain bidding in first-price auctions. I 
show that bidding in induced-value first-price sealed-bid auctions can be rationalized as a 
combination of reactions to underlying ambiguity and anticipated loss aversion. Using data 
from experimental auctions, I provide evidence that in induced-value auctions with human 
bidders, this approach works well. In auctions with prior experience and /or against risk-neutral 
Nash rivals where ambiguity effects could be altogether irrelevant, anticipated loss aversion by 
itself can explain aggressive bidding. This is a novel result in the literature. Using data from 
experiments, I find that ambiguity effects become negligible in auctions with experienced 
human bidders against (i) experienced human rivals and (ii) Nash computer rivals, when loss 
aversion is taken in consideration. The estimates for loss aversion are similar in auctions with 
human bidders (with or without experience).   
 
 
         Next, I extend my approach of anticipated loss aversion to address bidding outcomes in 
first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. As shown in first part, the model predicts 
overbidding in first-price induced-value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory 
experiments. However, substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity 
auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the 
consumption space. Differences also result in second-price auctions. The study thereby 
indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced-value laboratory 
experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse and anticipate such 
losses at the time of bidding. 
                     Finally, I explore the effect of resale or procurement opportunities, to which 
bidders have heterogeneous market access, on bidding in first- price sealed-bid auctions. My 
models suggest that in auctions with resale, loss aversion causes underbidding with respect to 
the risk-neutral-Nash prediction. Bidders with greatest level of market access are least affected 
by loss aversion and therefore bid closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than bidders with smaller 
market access. In auctions with procurement, the effect of loss aversion is such that it causes 
overbidding (underbidding) for bidders with respect to the risk-neutral-Nash. Bidders with 
greatest level of market access are again least affected by loss aversion and therefore bid 
much conservatively and closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than bidders with very low market 
access. If market access is interpreted as a proxy for experience, the predictions of my model 
are qualitatively similar to the findings in List (2003, 2004).  Since these indirect effects are 
obtained without altering reference-dependent preferences, it raises the possibility that the 
effects obtained in List (2003, 2004) in field settings may not arise entirely due to the direct 
effect of experience on reference-dependent preferences. This calls for a more careful 
reexamination of the underlying issues.  
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Chapter 1: Reference-Dependent Preferences in Auctions  
In this dissertation, I explore the effect of reference-dependent preferences on bidding 
in auctions. Loss aversion is widely suspected as the primary influence that manifests 
in trading of various commodities – from chocolate bars to coffee mugs, coins, or 
sportscards – for money or other goods (Knetsch 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; Benartzi and Thaler 1995, Camerer 1995, List 
2003). In their formulation of the Prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
assume the current endowment level as a fixed reference point. Any change from the 
reference point is interpreted as “gains” or “losses” by individuals and the disutility 
induced by “losses” are larger than the utility induced by “gains” producing a kink at 
the reference point. Such preferences reconcile the “endowment effect” obtained in 
the literature above.  
        The literature on consumer psychology has discussed how consumers get 
affected by reference prices in everyday transactions (Urbany, Bearden and 
Weilbaker 1988, Kalyanaram and Winer 1995, Mazumdar et al. 2005). Various 
experiments on online auctions suggest that bidders get influenced by auctions’ 
reserve prices (Ariely and Simonson 2003, H¨aubl and Popkowski Leszczyc 2003), 
Kamins et al. 2004, and Suter and Hardest, 2005). Such effects have also been 
observed in e-Bay “buy now” auctions where buy prices are believed to affect 
bidding decisions (Dodonova and Khoroshilov, 2004, Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 
2007, Shunda 2009). In such uncertain circumstances with anticipatory (forward-
looking) attitudes a fixed reference point based approach seems less plausible.  
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                 In such circumstances when bidders face uncertain payoff consequences, 
and “anticipate” uncertain outcomes, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), Gul (1991) 
Sugden (2003) and Köszegi and Rabin (2006) suggested alternative formulation of 
reference points. While Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) and Gul (1991), propose the 
endogenously determined expected value of the prospect, Sugden (2003) assumes the 
reference to be given by the current endowment which might adjust over the time as a 
reference point. One another model with endogenous definition of reference points 
was proposed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006). The Köszegi and Rabin’s approach is 
more general and bears similarities with previous approaches in simpler 
environments
1
 and allows heterogeneous loss aversion for commodities that make the 
consumption bundle. This brings certain advantages that are apparent in commodity 
transactions where consumption space in multidimensional.  
                    I base the analysis in this dissertation on a model of loss aversion with 
endogenous reference points similar to Köszegi and Rabin (2006) to explore the 
effect on bidding in auctions. This is different from an approach with an exogenous 
fixed reference point in which winning the auction is interpreted as a “gain” while 
losing leaves the initial wealth unaffected. I argue that the reference point may get 
influenced by expected gains and therefore auction outcomes could be interpreted as 
“gains” or “losses.” It is plausible that a bidder who draws a high value and expects to 
win the auction interprets “not winning” as a “loss” and likewise that a bidder with 
low induced-value interprets winning the auction as a “gain.” In a sealed-bid auction, 
after placing a bid, bidders face a lottery of winning or losing the auction. The 
                                               
1 For example, with forward looking rational expectations based reference, it is equivalent to 
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) and Gul (1991) in induced value first-price auction. 
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probabilities and potential payoffs depend on their own and other bidders’ bids. The 
final outcome is then evaluated with respect to any possible outcome from this lottery 
as a reference point.  
It is noteworthy that my approach though similar to Köszegi and Rabin (2006) is 
slightly different. In an auction where bidders have rational forward-looking 
expectations, the probability of various auction outcomes could be derived upon 
placing the bid. It is therefore natural to assume that the bidders anticipate the effects 
of bidding on both the reference as well as payoff distribution, i.e. both are chosen at 
the same time. This makes my approach slightly different from the Köszegi and 
Rabin (2006).
2
 Because of its anticipatory nature, my approach becomes equivalent 
to Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) and Gul (1991) in induced-value auctions and it is 
well suited to capture the effect of heterogeneous loss aversion in commodity 
auctions.  
I apply a more general Prospect theory approach which allows non-linear probability 
weighting and anticipated loss aversion to explore bidding in induced-value auctions 
(Chapter 2). In chapter 3, I apply a reference-dependent approach to derive potential 
differences in induced-value and commodity auctions. More specifically, I show that 
simultaneous presence of money and commodity loss aversion could influence 
bidding differently than money loss aversion alone. Finally, in chapter 4, I explore the 
effect of heterogeneous resale or procurement access on bidding.  
The dissertation extends the domain of loss averse preferences as applied in other 
contexts to auctions.  This rationalizes aggressive bidding in first-price auctions and 
                                               
2 This is discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. 
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yields some interesting implications for bidding in auctions in general. Highlighting 
potential differences between induced-value and commodity auctions adds to the 
current debate on the link between lab and field settings (e.g., Harrison and List 2004; 
Levitt and List 2007a, 2007b; List 2003). The findings more generally raise some 
concerns for transferring qualitative behavioral findings from the lab to the field.  
       Finally in chapter 4, I explore the effect of differences in trading intentions that 
arise due to heterogeneous access on bidding in auctions. While a formal treatment of 
how experience effects bidding directly could be more challenging, if market access 
is interpreted as a proxy for bidder experience, it becomes possible to analyze the 
indirect effects of experience on bidding in an auction with outside alternatives.  In 
auctions with resale, loss aversion causes underbidding with respect to the risk-
neutral-Nash predictions. Bidders with highest access over favorable prices are least 
affected by loss aversion and therefore bid closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than 
bidders with smaller access to favorable prices. In auctions with procurement, the 
attachment effect is such that it causes overbidding (underbidding) for bidders with 
respect to the risk-neutral-Nash. Bidders with greatest level of market access are 
again least affected by loss aversion and therefore bid much conservatively and closer 
to the risk-neutral-Nash than bidders with less favorable access to procurement prices. 
Thus, the predictions of my model are qualitatively similar to the findings in List 
(2003, 2004) which suggest that market experience attenuates the endowment effect. 
Since these indirect effects are observed without altering reference-dependent 
preferences, it raises the possibility that the effects obtained in List (2003, 2004) may 
not arise entirely due to direct effect of experience on such preferences. 
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Chapter 2: Reference-Dependent Preferences in First-Price 
Auctions 
1. Introduction 
Auctions have become extremely popular for transferring goods and services. Their 
use can be traced back to 500 B.C. in ancient Babylon. Since Vickrey (1961)
3
 
economists have tried to explore bidding and auction outcomes under various 
experimental settings.
4
 In induced-value first-price auctions, subjects bid in excess of 
the risk-neutral-Nash predictions in laboratory conditions (“Overbidding” Anomaly: 
Cox et al 1982, 1988, 1996; Harrison 1989). Although risk aversion can explain such 
aggressive behavior, skepticism surrounding risk aversion as the sole explanation has 
prompted scholars to explore other behavioral alternatives
5
 (Salo and Weber 1995, 
Goeree et al. 2002, Dorsey and Razzolini 2003, Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis 2003, 
Kagel 1995, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). In this paper I propose a different 
alternative which combines elements of Prospect theory: loss aversion and non-linear 
probability weighting. 
                  In first-price sealed-bid auctions, the probability of winning for a given 
bid depends on the joint distribution of induced-values, risk attitudes, and the 
unknown strategies of rival bidders. Thus, missing information about other bidders’ 
induced-values, risk posture, and/or bidding strategies exposes bidders to submit bids 
                                               
3 Vickrey (1961) provides the theoretical foundations of various auction mechanisms. 
4 There is a rich variation of laboratory and field experiments that employ various types of subjects and 
auctioned objects. 
5 Some other behavioral explanations include-nonlinear probability weighting (ambiguity aversion), 
spiteful preferences, regret aversion, etc. 
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in an inherently “ambiguous”
6
 environment. Ambiguity effects as captured in 
Ellsberg paradox (1961) have been observed in market experiments (Camerer and 
Kunreuther 1989, Sarin and Weber 1993)
7
 and could influence bidding in auctions as 
well (Salo and Weber 1995, Chen et al 2007)
8
. In auctions against human bidders, 
prior bidding experience
9
 could make it easier to derive missing information thereby 
reducing the level of ambiguity. Moreover, additional controls for missing 
information have been applied which present even smaller levels of ambiguity in 
these auctions. For example, when bidding against risk-neutral Nash computer 
bidders, there is no uncertainty about bidders’ risk attitudes and bidding strategies. 
Therefore, ambiguity effects should become smaller in these auction environments. 
While efforts have been made to explore the effect of ambiguity on bidding in first-
price auctions (Chen et al. 2007) some other behavioral explanations can’t explain 
overbidding in auctions against Nash computer bidders’.
10
 In this paper, I exploit the 
difference between bidding against human bidders versus computer bidders to 
demonstrate the existence of ambiguity effects as well as another determinant of 
behavior: loss aversion.   
                                               
6 Thus, ambiguity reflects a scenario where missing probabilistic information must be derived. 
7 In Sarin and Weber (1993) the market prices for ambiguous assets were consistently below the 
corresponding prices for equivalent unambiguous assets. An asset is a two-stage lottery with risk (well-
defined probabilities) and ambiguity (probabilities not well-defined). This effect was stronger when 
these assets were traded simultaneously. However there is weaker evidence that ambiguity affects 
insurance markets in Camerer and Kunreuther (1989). 
8 Ambiguity (unlike risk) better characterizes decision making in many real-world situations. E.g., the 
success rate of new drugs, insurance against previously unknown environmental hazards, terrorist 
activities, outcomes of R&D and success of new products in consumer goods markets (see references 
in Chen et al. 2007).  
9 In auctions where all bidders have prior experience and act similarly. 
10 Spiteful preferences or ambiguity aversion cannot explain why humans bid aggressively against 
computers whose bidding strategies are known, and therefore the objective probability of winning the 
auction conditional on bid can be derived fairly easily or conveyed to human bidders. 
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        I base the analysis in this paper on a model of loss aversion with endogenous 
reference points similar to Köszegi and Rabin (2006). This is different from an 
approach with an exogenous fixed reference point in which winning the auction is 
interpreted as a “gain” while losing leaves the initial wealth unaffected. I argue that 
the reference point may get influenced by expected gains and therefore auction 
outcomes could be interpreted as “gains” or “losses.” It is plausible that a bidder who 
draws a high value and expects to win the auction interprets “not winning” as a “loss” 
and likewise a bidder with low induced-value interprets winning the auction as a 
“gain.” This has been observed in other contexts. For example, loss aversion has been 
observed in trading of various commodities – from chocolate bars to coffee mugs, 
coins, or sportscards – for money or other goods (Knetsch 1989; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; Benartzi and Thaler 1995, 
List 2003). I show that anticipated loss aversion by itself (irrespective of other 
behavioral explanations) can explain aggressive bidding in first-price auctions and 
captures an important behavioral influence on bidding. Thus, my approach provides a 
justification for aggressive bidding in auctions where ambiguity effects could be 
minimal or altogether absent. Other behavioral explanations-spiteful preferences, 
non-linear probability weighting, anticipated regret aversion, disappointment aversion 
- could also explain aggressive bidding just like anticipated loss aversion. Unlike a 
regret-based explanation (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007), my approach does not rely 
on ex-post information to explain aggressive bidding; spiteful preferences (Morgan, 
Steiglitz and Reis 2003) can’t explain why human bidders bid aggressively against 
computer bidders. And finally, when the auction winner earns only the monetary 
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profit as in laboratory experiments,
11
 my approach is equivalent to the disappointment 
aversion model as in Gul (1991).
12
   
        Two prominent approaches to address ambiguity attitudes in the literature are the 
maximin expected utility (MMEU model) (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) and Choquet 
expected utility (CEU) model (Gilboa 1987, Schmeidler 1989). I take the CEU 
approach, which allows subjective distortion of objective probability measures to 
capture attitudes towards ambiguity, exactly as in Salo and Weber (1995) and Goeree 
et al (2002). I propose a model of endogenous expectations, similar to Köszegi and 
Rabin (2006), to accommodate reference-dependent preferences and attitudes towards 
ambiguity. This is consistent in the spirit of Prospect theory, which allows both non-
linear probability weighting and loss aversion.   
                  Theoretically, as special cases of my approach, either non-linear 
probability weighting or loss aversion can explain observed bidding outcomes. I show 
that when bidders are loss averse and fully anticipate potential “losses”, overbidding 
is justified even without non-linear probability weighting. Thus, I suggest loss 
aversion as an alternative explanation for aggressive bidding in auctions. When I rely 
on non-linear probability weighting alone, my approach is behaviorally equivalent to 
previous explanations that explain overbidding in terms of risk aversion or ambiguity-
aversion (Salo and Weber 1995; Goeree et al 2002).  
                                               
11 This is different in field where auction object is exchanged for a monetary price (bid).  In Lange and 
Ratan (2009) we discuss the differences that could arise between the auctions conducted in induced-
value (laboratory) settings and field in the context of the model, offered here. 
12 Since I allow nonlinear probability weighting, my approach differs from Gul’s approach; in the 
special case of linear probability weighting, the two approaches are similar. This equivalence breaks 
down in field auctions where the auction object is exchanged for the bid. The implications of a model 
based on loss aversion for various auction settings are further explored in Lange and Ratan (2009). 
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      Using data from First-price auction lab experiments, I provide evidence that the 
general approach that combines loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting 
provides a good fit for observed bids. This approach is capable of addressing the 
differences in ambiguity across auction environments and explains aggressive bidding 
in auctions with prior experience (with loss aversion) against (i) experienced human 
bidders and (ii) risk-neutral Nash-computer bidders. In these auctions, drawing 
probabilistic inferences (conditional on bids) is relatively easier, and ambiguity 
effects could be irrelevant,
13
 and therefore smaller deviations between subjective and 
objective probabilities are expected.
14
   
          I estimate the behavioral parameters in my models using experimental data 
(Cox et al 1982, Harrison 1989) and test the hypothesis for probability weighting 
under less ambiguous circumstances.  I provide evidence that in auctions against 
human bidders aggressive bidding can be rationalized as a combination of loss 
aversion and ambiguity-aversion; the estimates for loss aversion in auctions with 
human bidders (irrespective of prior experience) are similar, whereas probability 
weighting becomes less convex in auctions that present successively reduced levels of 
ambiguity. This results in smaller deviations between subjective and objective 
probabilities. When loss aversion is allowed, this yields an almost linear probability 
weighting in auctions with prior experience against (i) experienced human and (ii) 
risk-neutral Nash bidders.  
                                               
13 In an experiment reported in Dorsey and Razzolini (2003), the probability of winning conditional on 
bids is conveyed to the subjects. 
14 The evidence on ambiguity attitudes suggests that ambiguity aversion is more prevalent. In addition 
to the experiments that are replications of the Ellsberg paradox (Fox and Tversky 1998), Sarin and 
Weber (1993) find that the price of ambiguous two-stage lotteries is lower than equivalent 
unambiguous lotteries obtained through double-market auctions. 
10 
 
          In the following sections I motivate the general Prospect theory model for 
bidding in auctions (sections 2 and 3). I apply the model to auctions with risk-neutral 
Nash bidders (section 4), and analyze the experimental data in sections 5 and 6. 
Finally, I discuss my results and conclude (sections 7 and 8). 
2. Prospect Theory: Reference-Dependence and Non-linear 
Probability Weighting 
In this section I describe the behavioral assumptions in my approach to address 
bidding in laboratory first-price auctions. In laboratory auctions, values are induced 
and profits are paid in monetary units. Thus, consumption occurs in a single 
dimension.
15
  Following Köszegi and Rabin (2006), an individual’s utility ( | )u c r  
depends both on her consumption c  and her reference level r .  The “direct” 
consumption utility ( )v c  is obtained when realized consumption is the same as the 
reference level, i.e., ( ) ( | )v c u c c , and the individual utility when her consumption 
differs from her reference is defined as 
( | ) ( ) - max[0, ( ) - ( )]lu c r v c k v r v c     (1) 
with 0 lk . lk  
is the scalar gradient which captures the sensation of “loss” when less 
favorable outcomes are realized.
16
 
Ex ante, both reference levels and consumption could be stochastic. Following 
Köszegi and Rabin (2006), the reference level is a probability measure G  over  
                                               
15 Unlike laboratory auctions where induced-values are induced in money and profits are paid in 
monetary units, in real auctions the object is awarded to the winner in return for money. In Lange and 
Ratan (2009), we discuss the implications arising from this difference when loss aversion associated 
with the object and money may differ. 
16 I normalize psychological “gains” to zero.   
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and consumption is drawn according to the probability measure H  over . Then, 
the individual’s overall expected utility over risky outcomes is given by 
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )U H G u c r dG r dH c    (2) 
In an equilibrium (for a first-price auction) captured by a strictly increasing 
symmetric bidding function, the bid determines the probability of winning and the 
consequent profits for a bidder.  Since no further action is possible after placing the 
bid, the bid not only defines the probability of consumption outcomes ( H ) but also 
defines the probability of reference outcomes ( G ). Thus, for a bidder with rational 
expectations H G , and the reference point G  is endogenously determined.
17
  
The other important feature of prospect theory is non-linear probability weighting 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). As discussed earlier, auction environments could 
vary in terms of underlying ambiguity. Two prominent approaches to address 
ambiguity attitudes in the literature are maximin expected utility (MMEU) (Gilboa 
and Schmeidler 1989) and Choquet expected utility (CEU) (Gilboa 1987, Schmeidler 
1989). In the MMEU model, decision makers have a set of priors over outcomes and 
choose the actions that maximize the minimum expected utility over the set of priors. 
In the CEU model, decision makers’ beliefs are represented by a set of non-additive 
probability measure (capacities).
18
 I take the CEU approach, which allows subjective 
                                               
17 Alternative reference-dependent models with endogenous definition of reference points are given by 
Sugden (2003) and Munro and Sugden (2003) who assume the reference to be given by the current 
endowment which might adjust over the time. One other fixed reference could be the weighted 
expected value of the prospect, which is also determined endogenously in one-shot games (Kahnemann 
and Tversky 1979). 
18
 Some recent contributions aim at characterizing ambiguity without restricting attention to specific 
decision models, or functional-form considerations. E.g., Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). 
12 
 
distortion of objective probability measures to capture attitudes towards ambiguity.
19
 
Ambiguity effects should become smaller in auctions with prior bidding experience 
and/or against risk-neutral Nash bidders
20
, thereby producing smaller distortions of 
objective probabilities. I therefore assume that each bidder distorts the objective 
probability measure P  through the following probability weighting function as in 
Salo and Weber (1995) and Goeree et al (2002): 
( )P P  where 0   21                                                     (3) 
Under this assumption H  and G  in (2) could be non-linearly weighted measures of 
probability as defined in (3).
22
 Thus an individual solves the following program: 
max ( | )U H H                                                                 (4) 
This specification is however slightly different from the general setting discussed by 
Köszegi and Rabin (2006). In their approach, action takes place after a reference 
distribution has been formed. Given a reference distribution G , the individual 
therefore chooses ( )H G  to maximize ( | )U H G . In equilibrium, rational expectations 
then require that the consumption distribution is chosen such that it is consistent with 
                                               
19 Thus, I assume that probability distortions arise entirely as a response to ambiguity. This approach is 
similar to Salo and Weber (1995) and Goeree et al (2002). 
20 Since deriving missing information about rivals’ risk attitudes and equilibrium bidding strategies 
could become easier. 
21 
 
governs the elevation of the probability weighting function with respect to the 45-degree line. 
The 45-degree line describes linear probability weighting. ( )1  
 
implies overweighting 
(underweighting) of probability. This functional specification is a special case of the probability 
weighting function described in Prelec (1998): ( ) exp( ( log ) )P P      , in which 1  ; thus, 
my approach is less general. Moreover, in previous attempts to fit the more general form for bidding in 
first-price auctions, I found that 1  . Later I discuss other evidence in the literature that supports 
this functional form for uncertain circumstances where probabilities are derived and not known 
exclusively. 
22 Later, I show how the auction outcomes are weighted in my model. 
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the formulation of the reference point, i.e. ( )H G G .  In sealed-bid auction 
equilibrium, given the beliefs of bidders’ bidding strategies, a bid uniquely 
determines the probability of various auction outcomes for each bidder. This allows 
the formulation of a probability distribution over consumption and reference 
outcomes simultaneously. A rational bidder applies the same weighting to the 
objective probability measure associated with reference and consumption levels. This 
allows a complete specification of overall expected utility for a bidder who fully 
anticipates ensuing “losses” as defined in (4). 
3. The First-Price Auction Environment 
In this section I discuss the bidding problem in a first-price auction for a bidder with 
behavioral characteristics as described in the previous section. 
I consider n  bidders 1,...,i n  and assume symmetric behavioral preferences, i.e. that 
bidders share the same characteristics for loss aversion and probability weighting; this 
is common knowledge. In my framework, unique identification of risk preferences 
and non-linear probability weighting is not possible. Therefore, bidders are assumed 
to be risk-neutral in the numeraire consumption, i.e. ( )iv c c . In the laboratory 
auction, 
iv  
is directly induced in monetary units. Each bidder draws her induced-
value 
iv  
from a probability distribution defined by the distribution function F  
defined over [ , ]v v  ( 0v v  ); each bidder knows his induced-value, and knows that 
other bidders’ induced-values are also drawn independently from distribution F .
23
 
                                               
23 In laboratory auctions, overbidding beyond induced-value entails negative payoff and is always 
suboptimal.However, in Harrison (1989) this restriction is not imposed explicitly. 
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The bidding problem for a typical bidder in a laboratory first-price auction is 
described in figure 1. In equilibrium for symmetric bidders, which can be depicted 
through a strictly increasing bid function ( ) ( )j j jB v B v where j i  for all other 
bidders, a bid 
iB   for bidder i  defines her objective probability of winning the 
auction. This is weighted non-linearly by the bidder. Thus, a bidder can formulate an 
endogenous reference lottery for each feasible bid that captures his expectations 
(beliefs) of various auction outcomes. The auction outcome follows. Ex-ante, losing 
the auction could be interpreted as loss and weighted with respect to the endogenous 
reference formulated at the time of bidding. 
 
Figure 1: Bidding Problem in a First-Price Auction 
 
 
Note that a bidder’s reference is defined by her beliefs about the relevant outcomes 
held between the time she formulates her bid and shortly before the auction outcome 

















is observed. The degenerate utility in a first -price sealed-bid auction that captures the 




- - , 0
( | )
- ( - ) 0, -
0 0
i i i i
i i i i
PT
l i i i i
v B when c r v B
v B when c v B r
u c r









The overall expected utility for a bidder with preferences as given in section 2 (based 
on conditions (1)-(4)) is given by: 
( , ) ( ( ))( ) ( ( ))(1 ( ( )))( )PT i i i i i l i i i iv B f B v B k f B f B v B                  
(5) 
where ( )if B  
and ( ( ))if B are the objective and weighted probability of winning for a 
given bid. The first term is the weighted expected direct consumption utility (value) 
and the second captures the psychological “losses” when the bidder unexpectedly 
loses the auction.
24
 Note that bidding yields nonnegative payoff for moderate levels 
of loss aversion; for high levels of loss aversion bidding 
i iB v  maximizes overall 
payoff.
25
 Also note that weighted expected value is also determined endogenously for 
an equilibrium bid and could be used as a fixed reference to evaluate the reference-
dependent utility of various outcomes (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). This is 
equivalent to the lottery (Köszegi-Rabin) approach as discussed in the previous 
section and yields the same overall expected utility as in (5).
 26
As mentioned before, 
with linear probability weighting and induced-value (laboratory) settings where 
                                               
24 Note when there is no loss aversion, 0lk   
, this becomes a probability weighted model alone. In 
addition, when there is no probability weighting, this becomes a risk-neutral Nash model. 
25 The maximum payoff in this case is zero. 
26 In the fixed reference approach, only the auction outcome of not winning yields psychological loss 
with respect to the reference of the expected value for a given bid. 
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auction winner earns the monetary profit, my approach is equivalent to the 
disappointment aversion model as in Gul (1991).
27
   
It should be noted that (5) implies that a non-negative expected utility gain ( , )PT i iv B  
from participating in the auction can only result if 1 (1 ( ( )))l ik f B  . That is, auction 
yields positive utility only for bidders with ( ( )) 1 1/i lf B k   . If 1lk  , this condition 
holds for all bidders. If 1lk  , the condition implies only bidders with a sufficiently 
large probability to win derive positive payoff from placing positive bids.  
I restrict attention to symmetric monotonically increasing equilibria in pure strategies. 
In equilibrium, the chances of player i  to win are given by 1( )n iH v
 . With the above 
argument, auction yields positive utility only if 1( ( )) 1 1/n i lH v k
   . Given (.) , the 
threshold value ˆ( )lv k  beyond which positive utility is realized is defined by  
1 ˆ( ( ( ))) max[0,1 1/ ]n l lH v k k
       (5a) 
Note that ˆ( )lv k v  if 1lk  . Bidders with ˆ[ ( ), ]j lv v k v  shall place positive 
equilibrium bids that yield positive overall payoff. Maximizing (5) with respect to 
iB  
yields a strictly increasing (optimal) bid function. 
 
                                               
27 In Gul’s model, disappointment could arise from paying a higher than expected price and/or losing 
the profit (based on higher price) due to losing the lottery. In a first-price auction, the price paid equals 
the bid in case of winning; so the only source of disappointment arises from not realizing the expected 
profit (certainty equivalent- ( )( )i i if B v B ) when the auction is lost which occurs with probability
(1 ( ))if B . The last term therefore fully captures the disappointment as discussed in Gul (1991). 
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Proposition 1: (-First Price Auction against Human bidders-) The unique 
monotonically increasing symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) bid function 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
It is clear from the above that (i) ˆ( )lv k  
 varies with 
lk  and   and (ii) for bidders with 
ˆ( )i lv v k the equilibrium bid depends on lk  and  .
28
 Thus, for ˆ( )i lv v k  
we can 
explore the marginal effects of changes in 
lk   
and   on equilibrium bids.  
 








 (ii) (-Effect of probability weighting-) Greater   (more 







when 0.9951 1lk   
and bidders with very small induced-values such that 
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   ) bid 







Proof: See Appendix. 
                                               
28




Intuitively, the tradeoff that determines the optimal bid for loss averse bidders differs 
from the tradeoff without loss aversion. Loss averse bidders are willing to pay a 
higher price to avoid the “losses” from not realizing the profits upon winning. This 
induces more aggressive bidding for any monotonic probability weighting. Thus, 
anticipated loss aversion by itself explains overbidding with respect to risk-neutral 
Nash equilibrium.
29
 For example, if the ambiguity confronting the bidder is smaller, 
(such that ambiguity effects could be smaller or altogether irrelevant
30
) then 
anticipated loss aversion would suffice to rationalize aggressive bidding.  
           Before I explore the effect of probability weighting on equilibrium bidding it is 
noteworthy that bidders could avoid “losses” in the following ways: (a) if the value 
draw is not high enough then bid upto their value to avoid “losses”, (b) and if the 
value draw is high enough they could either bid (i) more aggressively or (ii) less 
aggressively, in response to more convex probability weighting. In the latter scenario, 
when the value draw is high enough less aggressive bidding could happen because 
bid also affects the expectation of auction outcomes simultaneously. Higher   means 
lower elevation of the probability weighting curve and causes more aggressive 
bidding which suggests ambiguity-aversion (or bidder pessimism) in most 
circumstances except the following: when 0.9951 1lk   
some bidders with very small 
                                               
29 In addition to other behavioral influences that could justify aggressive bidding with respect to the 
RNNE bid. 
30 For example, in auctions with experienced bidders and/or against risk-neutral Nash bidding 
strategies, deriving missing information regarding the probability of winning for a bid could be easier. 
Such auctions therefore present smaller levels of ambiguity for a bidder. 
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induced-values could bid less aggressively. 
31
 Therefore, as a special case of 
Proposition 1, one can justify aggressive bidding entirely as a response to underlying 
ambiguity with non-linear probability weighting (without loss aversion 0lk  ). 
Aggressive bidding with respect to the RNNE would then suggest that “ambiguity-
aversion” or “bidder pessimism” causes underweighting the probability of winning 
for given bids (Salo and Weber 1995, Goeree. et al 2002). 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The marginal response to greater competition is similar to the effect of probability 
weighting; as before, when value draw is high enough, bidders could avoid “losses” 
by bidding more or less aggressively, in response to more competition; this happens 
because their bid affects their expectation of auction outcomes simultaneously. The 
effect of greater competition is analogous to more convex probability weighting and 
causes aggressive bidding in most circumstances except the following: when 
                                               
31 For any bidder, more convex probability weighting, affects overall payoffs by affecting the weighted 
probability of winning, direct expected payoff and anticipated “losses”; for most bidders the net effect 
of more convex probability is such that it yields more aggressive bidding; however when 




0.9951 1lk   
some bidders with very small induced-values could bid less 
aggressively. Thus, despite behavioral preferences, in most circumstances bidders 




In the following sections, I provide evidence that my approach which allows loss 
aversion performs quite well in induced-value auctions, but identifying suitable 
reference points
33
presents a major challenge in applying Prospect theory based 
approaches to other contexts, e.g., in common value auctions.  
           As discussed earlier, the general model is capable of addressing the differences 
in ambiguity across auction environments. Intuitively, ambiguity effects should 
become smaller in auctions where bidders have prior bidding experience against (i) 
experienced human bidders and (ii) risk-neutral Nash bidders, thereby producing 
smaller deviations between weighted and objective probabilities. I shall explore this 
hypothesis in the following section. It should be noted, however, that bidding against 
Nash risk-neutral bidders is not a special case of the equilibrium bid as discussed so 
far. Instead, it merely represents the best response of the player. In the following I 
derive the best response bid under given behavioral assumptions in these auctions.  
4. Auctions against Nash (risk-neutral) bidders 
In this section I address bidding in induced-value auctions against Nash risk-neutral 
computer bidders. In these auctions, bidders are informed ex-ante that other bidders 
                                               
32 Except when 0.9951 1lk   
  some bidders with very small induced-values the net effect of greater 
competition yields less aggressive bidding, as in the case of probability weighting before. 
33 How people develop reference points could be contextual and plausible reference points could differ 
under different circumstances. 
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always bid a certain fraction (the risk-neutral Nash bid) of their induced-values.
34
 The 
auction environment is the same except that bidders face Nash risk-neutral computer 
bidders. There is no uncertainty in these auctions about risk attitudes and equilibrium 
strategies that rival bidders employ. Thus, the ambiguity confronting the bidder 
becomes smaller in these auctions. Some other behavioral explanations for 
overbidding (considered in isolation) do not apply in these auctions. E.g., it is 
unlikely that humans will harbor spite against computer bidders; thus, spiteful 
preferences cannot explain aggressive bidding in these auctions. Similarly, the 
estimates of risk aversion obtained in these auctions are not similar to those observed 
in auctions against human bidders.
35
 Although combining risk aversion with spite 
could explain overbidding against risk-neutral Nash computerized bidders, such a 
model by itself is not capable of addressing the changes in ambiguity on bidding 
behavior in these auctions.
36
 The Prospect theoretic framework that I motivated 
earlier is capable of addressing changes in ambiguity on bidding in these auctions.  
Each bidder relies only on her induced characteristics, as described in the preference 
structure defined in (1)-(4).
37
 Consistent with the experimental setup, I assume that 
induced-values are drawn from a uniform distribution over the support [0,1]  . Since it 
is known that rival bidders’ bids are Nash (risk-neutral) best responses,
38
 the bidder 
                                               
34 In some variants of these experiments (Dorsey and Razzolini 2003), probability of winning, 
conditional upon bids was also shown to bidders. 
35 This is obvious by looking at the estimates of the probability-weighted model (no loss aversion) in 
auctions against risk- neutral Nash bidders (Table 5). Variations in probability weighting would 
therefore suggest variation in risk attitudes. 
36 Among other explanations, ambiguity aversion and risk aversion could also rationalize bidding 
outcomes in these auctions. However, uniquely identifying risk and ambiguity attitudes could be 
extremely difficult when they are modeled together.  
37 We don’t need to assume symmetric behavioral characteristics to derive the optimal bid response. 




need not take into account the strategic consequences of his bids. This yields the 
following overall expected utility for the bidder who maximizes expected payoffs: 
1 1 1max ( , ) (( ) ) (( ) )(1 (( ) ) ( )
i
n n n
PT i i i l i i i i
v B v
v B B k B B v B        
 
                   (7) 
where / ( 1)n n    , 1( )niB
 , and 1(( ) )niB 

 
are the objective and weighted 
probability of winning conditional on bid. The first term is the weighted direct 
consumption utility (value) and the second captures the psychological “losses” when 
the bidder loses but had expected to win the auction. Given the risk-neutral-Nash 
opponent bidders, bidders can ensure winning by placing a bid- ( 1) /n v n . 
As before, (7) implies that a non-negative expected utility gain ( , )PT i iv B  from 
participating in the auction can only result if 1 (1 ( ( )))l ik f B  . That is, auction 
yields positive utility only for bidders with ( ( )) 1 1/i lf B k   . If 1lk  , this 
condition holds for all bidders. If 1lk  , the condition implies only bidders with a 
sufficiently large probability of winning shall derive positive payoff from the auction 
by placing positive bids.  
I restrict attention to symmetric monotonically increasing equilibria. In equilibrium, 
the chances of player i  to win, are given by 1 1( ) ( )n ni iB H v
  . With the above 
argument, auction yields positive utility only if 1( ( )) 1 1/n i lH v k
   . Given (.) , the 
threshold value ˆ( )lv k  beyond which positive utility is realized is defined by  
1 ˆ( ( )) max[0,1 1/ ]n lH v k
       (7a) 
Note that ˆ( )lv k v  if 1lk  . For bidders with ˆ( )i lv v k  
bidding their induced-value 
ensures maximizes overall payoff. Bidders with ˆ[ ( ), ]j lv v k v  shall place positive 
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equilibrium bids that yield positive overall payoff. Maximizing (7) with respect to 
iB  




Proposition 4: (-First-price auction against Nash bidders-) The unique optimal bid 
for loss averse bidders who weigh probabilities non-linearly (against Nash risk-
neutral bidders) is captured through the following monotonic relationship:  
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
It is clear from the above that (i) ˆ( )lv k  
 varies with 
lk  and   and (ii) for bidders with 
ˆ( )i lv v k  
the equilibrium bid depends on 
lk  and  . For iv v , the optimal bid attains 
a corner solution i.e.  
( 1)
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. This suggests that 
beyond the threshold induced-value v  it is optimal for bidders to bid ( 1) /n v n
 
 
that ensures winning the auction. If a bidder chooses a bid below ( 1) /n v n  and 
anticipates “losses”, then her bid is adjusted against loss aversion. For bidders with 
ˆ( )i lv v k  equilibrium bid ( )i iB v v  does not depend on  lk  and  . As a special case, 
when bidders are not loss averse and do not weigh probabilities non-linearly, this 
yields a best response in a Nash equilibrium. This allows characterizing the effect of 
loss aversion on bidding. 
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 For all plausible parameters 
 
and 





Proposition 5: (i) (-Effect of Loss Aversion-) In auctions with induced-values 
(against Nash risk-neutral bidders), for ˆ( )l iv k v v   loss aversion induces more 








(ii) (-Effect of probability weighting-) Greater   
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Proof: See appendix. 
 
This suggests that loss aversion has no effect on bidding when bidders either have 
very high or low induced-values. Beyond a certain threshold induced-value v
 
 it is 
optimal to bid ( 1) /n v n  and ensure winning the auction against risk-neutral Nash 
computer bidders.
40
 Bidders with very low induced-values, avoid “losses” by bidding 
their upto their value. However, for most bidders with intermediate range of induced-
values, anticipated loss aversion justifies aggressive bidding, with or without non-
linear probability weighting. Since the role of probability weighting is limited in these 
auctions, loss aversion by itself provides a sufficient justification for aggressive 
bidding, as evident in auction outcomes obtained through laboratory experimentation. 
               While discussing the effect of probability weighting on bidding, it is 
important to understand that the effect of probability weighting in such auctions could 
                                               
40
 Note that, ( 1) /n v n  is the highest possible bid in a risk-neutral Nash model. 
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be limited. Nevertheless, just like in auction against human bidders, bidders could 
avoid “losses” in the following ways: (a) if the value draw is not high enough then bid 
upto their value to avoid “losses”, (b) and if the value draw is high enough they could 
either bid (i) more aggressively or (ii) less aggressively, in response to more convex 
probability weighting; this happens because bid affects the expectation of auction 
outcomes simultaneously. Higher   means lower elevation of the probability 
weighting curve and in most circumstances causes more aggressive bidding which 
suggests ambiguity-aversion (or bidder pessimism); except when * 1lk k    and for 
iv  such that 
( 1) ln( ) ( )
[1 (1 2 ( ))]
[1 (1 ( ))]
l i i l
l i
l i
n k B B k
k B
k B






, more convex 
probability weighting causes less aggressive bidding. 
 
Proposition 6: (-Effect of greater competition-) For most human bidders (in most 
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Proof: See Appendix 
 
The marginal response to greater competition (more bidders) is similar to the 
marginal effect of probability weighting; as before, bidders could bid more or less 
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aggressively, in response to greater competition; this happens because their bid also 
affects their expectation of auction outcomes simultaneously. The effect of greater 
competition is analogous to more convex probability weighting and in most 
circumstances causes more aggressive bidding; for  ˆ 1lk k   and for iv  such that 
( 1)[ (1 ) ln( )] ( )
[1 (1 2 ( ))]
[1 (1 ( ))]
i i i i l
l i
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n B B B B k
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, bidders bid less 
aggressively in response to greater competition. Thus, despite behavioral preferences, 
in most circumstances bidders respond to greater competition along conventional 
lines by bidding more aggressively. 
    In the following section I fit the general model with probability weighting and loss 
aversion and its restricted versions which take into account loss aversion and non-
linear probability weighting in isolation to explain bidding using data from auctions 
with (i) human bidders and (ii) risk-neutral Nash computer bidders. Note that the 
equilibrium bidding behavior as specified in Propositions 1 and 3 differs across these 
auctions. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
Data 
I use data from induced-value first-price auctions reported in Cox et al. (1982) and 
Harrison (1989).  Cox et al. (1982) reports 210 auctions with different number of 
bidders, totaling 1170 bids in first-price auctions.
41
 A description of the data in Cox et 
al. (1982) is provided in Table 1.  
                                               
41 I ignore auctions with 3 bidders in these experiments. The results for these auctions are considered 
anomalous, and breakdown of non-cooperative bidding is suspected (Cox et al. 1982) 
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[Table 1 here] 
The experiments in Cox et al. (1982) employed undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory economics classes at the University of Arizona and Indiana University 
and were conducted over a number of years in the 1980s. The results based on this 
data have formed a benchmark for investigation of bidding outcomes in first-price 
auctions experiments (see Harrison 1989, Salo and Weber 1995, Goeree et al. 2002). 
The first-price auctions were conducted in sessions along with Dutch and second-
price auctions for single (hypothetical) objects. All sessions consisted of 30 sequential 
auctions (e.g., 10 Dutch, 10 first-price, and 10 Dutch). These auctions had the 
following features: Identifying variables include auction series, type of auction, 
observed bid/price, number of bidders, period, subject, and the support of the uniform 
distribution from which induced-values were drawn and induced.  Bidders were paid 
$3.00 for participation and a series of 30 auctions had an expected profit of $12. 
Thus, the total expected earnings were about $15 per subject. A session lasted for 
about one hour. Induced-values (in discrete multiples of 10 cents) were induced from 
uniform distributions with support over 0 and an upper limit that varied across 
different sets of auctions (see Table 2 for description). The number of bidders and the 
support from which induced-values were drawn (with replacement) were varied such 
that expected gains were similar across auctions. Overbidding beyond induced-values 
was not allowed, the object was awarded to the highest bidder at his bid, and the 
winning bid was displayed after the auction was concluded. The winner’s identity and 
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bid were not conveyed to the other bidders.
42
 The summary statistics of the data 
reported in Cox et al (1982) is provided in table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
The series of auctions where bidders have prior experience of bidding in first-price 
auctions have a suffix “x” in the name (see Table 1).  Thus, for auctions with 4 and 5 
bidders, we can explore the effect of “experience” on behavioral parameters.  
I also use data from Harrison (1989) in addition to Cox et al. (1982). Six experimental 
sessions were conducted using the design indicated in Table 3. The general 
procedures follow those introduced by Cox, Smith and Walker (1985b) and Cox et al. 
(1988), and are broadly similar to Cox et al. (1982). All subjects were economics 
undergraduates at the University of Western Ontario and received $3 just for showing 
up at the experimental session. The expected profit for a session of 20 auctions was 
roughly $10. Therefore, total expected earnings were $13 for each subject. All 
experimental sessions had 4 bidders whose induced-values were drawn from a 
uniform distribution with lower and upper valuations of $0.01 (or 1 point) and $10.00 
(or 1000 points). A description of the data reported in Harrison (1989) is provided in 
Table 3.  
[Table 3 here] 
I restrict my analysis to auctions with dollar payoff and compare the auctions with 
auctions involving inexperienced human rival in the following treatments: (i) subject 
experience and (ii) use of computer-simulated “Nash risk-neutral bidders.” Subjects 
                                               
42 This is quite unlike in real first-price auctions where such information can be public. The non-
availability of ex-post information that becomes the basis of “regret” therefore weakens anticipated 
“regret” as an explanation for overbidding in these auctions (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). Note that 
my explanation is invariant to ex-post information structure in these auctions.  
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have a similar level of experience in series 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In auctions 
against risk-neutral Nash bidders, a computer entered risk-neutral Nash equilibrium 
bids for the 3 bidders that each human bidder faces in an auction.  Subjects were 
informed ex-ante that the computer would bid 75% of the valuation that it drew for 
each of the 3 simulated bidders. The auctions in Harrison (1989) are different from 
the auctions in Cox et al. (1982) in the following ways: Bidding beyond induced-
value is allowed in Harrison (1989).  Bidders (human or simulated) were assigned 
randomly in each period. This controls for the use of multi-period strategies that can 
be employed when this randomization procedure is not in use. Valuations vary across 
bidders in a given replication and across periods. Each replication in a given period 
also employs the same N valuations, since replications occur simultaneously in a 
given experiment. The summary statistics of the auctions in Harrison (1989) is 
provided in Table 4. 
[Table 4 Here] 
Pooling of data 
1.  Induced-value distributions were varied across auctions with varying 
numbers of bidders in Cox et al. (1982) such that expected gains from 
participation in auctions were roughly similar. In my framework this design 
may not have the desired effect. Also, auctions with different numbers of 
bidders may present unique levels of ambiguity. Therefore, I do not pool the 
data from all the auctions together.  
2. In Cox et al. (1982) there are two series of auctions, “fdf” and “dfd” each 
composed of 10 consecutive auctions of a type. For example, “fdf” represents 
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10 first-price, 10 dutch, and 10 first-price auctions, and “dfd” represents 10 
dutch, 10 first-price, and 10 dutch auctions. I pool data from 20 first-price 
auctions from the series “fdf” and 10 first-price auctions from the series “dfd”.  
         Similarly, data from 20 sequential first-price auctions are pooled 
together from Harrison (1989). As observed earlier, randomization procedures 
adopted in Harrison (1989) control for the use of multi-period strategies that 
can be employed when this randomization procedure is not in use. (1989).  
An overview of bidding behavior 
An overview of bidding across auctions in Cox et al. (1982) and Harrison (1989) (in 
tables 2 and 4) reveals the following: (a) in auctions with 4 bidders, the number of 
bids above the risk-neutral Nash (henceforth overbids) ranges between 81-91% in 
Harrison (1989), as compared to 77.5-82.5% in Cox et al. (1982); (b) and in auctions 
with 5 or more bidders in Cox et al. (1982), the number of overbids ranges between 
66-86%. For all auctions (a) the amount by which bids exceed the risk-neutral Nash 
bids (overbid
43
) in Harrison (1989) is also higher (around 22%) than in Cox et al. 
(1982) (around 16%) and (b) the percentage absolute deviation
44
 around RNNE is 
also higher in Harrison (19-24%)  than in Cox et al. (1982) (12-20%).  
            In Cox et al.(1982)(a) in the second set of auctions with 6 bidders (series b), 
the number of overbids is substantially lower (66.7%) than in any other auctions; the 
average percentage overbid is also the lowest among all auctions, whereas the 
average percentage bid below the risk neutral Nash (henceforth underbid) is similar to 
                                               
43 Overbid=(bid-RNNE)/RNNE; Underbid=(RNNE-bid)/RNNE. 
44 Absolute deviation=abs(bid-RNNE)/RNNE. 
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other auctions; (b) in the other set of auctions with 6 bidders (series a) the number of 
overbids is 78.3%, which is similar to other auctions, but the average percentage 
underbid is around 23%, which is somewhat high; (c) in both series of auctions with 6 
bidders, 4 out of 10 bidders bid below RNNE in 50% of the auctions; and (d) in 
auctions with 9 bidders, low valuation bidders tended to bid close to zero, which 
yields an unusually high average underbid of around 27% below RNNE; 4 out of 10 
bidders bid below RNNE 50% of the time. Clearly, observed bids reflect differences 
in auction procedures, payoffs, and bidder characteristics.  
    In Harrison (1989) prior experience seems to affect bidding in against human 
bidders and against Risk-neutral Nash bidders. The number of bids above RNNE 
declines from 91% in auctions with inexperienced bidders to 89% in auctions with 
experienced bidders. This further declines to 81% in auctions with experienced 
bidders who face Nash bidders (see Table 4). The average percentage overbid above 
the RNNE declines from 23% to 21% in auctions against human bidders. This 
declines further to 18% in auctions with experienced bidders against Nash bidders. 
The average percentage absolute deviation around RNNE declines from 24% to 21% 
in auctions against human bidders. This further declines to 19% in auctions with 
experienced bidders against Nash bidders.  
             Such effects are not obvious in auctions in Cox et al. (1982). In auctions with 
4 bidders, number of overbids increase from 77.5% with inexperienced bidders to 
82.5% with experienced bidders. However, average overbid (underbid) declines from 
16.3% (34.2%) to 15.5% (20.9%). This yields a decline in average absolute deviation 
around RNNE from 20% to 16.3%.  Thus, prior experience lowers absolute deviation 
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around RNNE. However, an opposite effect is observed in auctions with 5 bidders. 
Although the number of bids with prior experience above RNNE declines from 
86.7% to 80%, the average percentage overbid declines from 14.2% to 13.8%; the 
average percentage underbid however increases from 17.6 to 20.5%. The average 
percentage absolute deviation around RNNE increases from 14.6% to 15.1%. Clearly, 
the effect of experience in auctions with 5 bidders, in terms of average percentage 
absolute deviations around RNNE, is different from that observed in other auctions.  
Omitted Observations 
In Cox et al. (1982), I estimate the parameters for different levels of competition 
without pooling the data. In auctions with 9 bidders, bidders with low induced-values 
tend to bid close to zero, clearly suggesting that cognitive costs of bidding exceed 
potential gains from optimal bidding. All bids that suggest more than 20% absolute 
deviation around RNNE (most of these bids are underbids close to zero) are therefore 
ignored for estimation purposes. I ignore bids that exceed induced-values in Harrison 
(1989). In auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders, only those bids that do not 
exceed the highest possible bid of 750 have been considered. Thus, the number of 
bids considered for estimation purposes are less than the number of bids reported in 
Harrison (1989). Outliers have been removed throughout. 
Estimation Procedure 
I use non-linear least squares estimation to minimize the squared errors between the 
observed and predicted bids to identify the behavioral parameters for the bidding 
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function in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
45
 This estimation has been done 
for the general model (outlined in Proposition 1) and the restricted versions of the 
general model which allow loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting in 
isolation. I have used MATLAB to implement a “Trust-region reflective Newton” 




The combined results for all the auctions are listed in Table 5; the table lists estimated 
behavioral parameters for auctions with varying levels of experience, number of 
bidders, and nature of opponent bidders ( humans or risk-neutral Nash bidders). The 
estimates for auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders are reported in the last set of 
rows in Table 5. 
[Table 5 here] 
i. Probability weighting and loss aversion in the general model 
The estimates of   are greater than 1 (and significantly different from zero in most 
cases
47
) in auctions against human bidders in both Cox et al. (1982) and Harrison 
(1989). Except for the auctions with 6 bidders in Cox et al. (1982), the estimates of 
 
are greater than 1.
48
 This yields convex probability weighting and therefore suggests 
                                               
45 If the errors between the predicted and observed bids are assumed independent identical normal 
random variables i.e. 2~ (0, )i NID   , then maximum likelihood and nonlinear least squares 
estimation are equivalent. ML estimates are consistent, asymptotically efficient and asymptotically 
normal; however, if this does not hold nonlinear least squares though not efficient remain consistent 
and asymptotically normal. 
46 The programming code underlying all the ensuing results is available upon request. 
47 Based on t-ratio. 
48 In auctions with 6 bidders (series B), the number of overbids is substantially lower (66.7%) than for 
any other auctions; the average overbid is also the lowest among all auctions, whereas the average 
underbid is similar to other auctions. In the other set of auctions with 6 bidders (series a) the number of 
overbids is 78.3%, which is similar to other auctions, but the average underbid is around 23%, which is 
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“ambiguity-aversion” along the lines of Salo and Weber (1995) and Goeree et al. 
(2002). In Harrison (1989), the estimates of   successively decline from 1.51 in 
auctions with inexperienced human bidders to 1.16 in auctions against human bidders 
and prior experience; this further declines to 1.01 in auctions against risk-neutral 
Nash bidders and prior experience. Note that a model based on risk-aversion alone 
cannot explain these changes.
49
  
The estimates of 
lk  are approximately close to 1 and significantly different from zero 
in most auctions against human bidders in Cox et al. (1982) and Harrison (1989). 
Except for auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders in Harrison (1989), where the 
estimate for 
lk  
is smaller but not significantly different from zero, the estimates are 
approximately close to 1, which supports loss aversion based on my model.  
ii. Probability weighting without loss aversion 
Although the estimates of   are greater than 1 and significantly different from zero in 
all auctions against human bidders for   in both Cox et al. (1982) and Harrison 
(1989), their magnitude is much larger. This yields more convex probability 
weighting and suggests larger deviations between the objective and weighted 
probabilities of auction outcomes.
50
 The estimates for auctions with 6 bidders in Cox 
et al. (1982) are much lower than the estimates for all other auctions. In Harrison 
                                                                                                                                      
somewhat high. In both series of auctions with 6 bidders, 4 out of 10 bidders bid below RNNE in 50% 
of the auctions. These auctions are therefore unusual and the estimates of 
 
which suggest 
overweighting (concave probability weighting), are somewhat out of order. 
49 Another aspect of the estimates for   relate to the deviation from 1 in the expected utility based 
models. In most auctions, when the estimates are greater than 1 in more than 50% cases (more than 
half of the auctions) they significantly improve the explanatory power of the model based on sum of 
squared errors and F-test. 
50 Also note than when loss aversion was considered the estimates for probability weighting were quite 
similar to each other which is not true when loss aversion is ignored. 
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(1989) the estimates of   decline from 3.02 in auctions with inexperienced bidders to 
2.32 in auctions with human bidders and prior bidding experience; this further 
declines to 1.70 in auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders and prior experience. As 
before, a model based on risk-aversion alone cannot explain these changes. 
 
iii. Loss aversion without probability weighting 
The estimates of 
lk  for most auctions in Cox et al (1982), except for auctions with 6 
bidders (series B), are approximately close to 1 and significantly different from zero. 
The estimates of 
lk  in auctions in Harrison (1989) are 1.00, 1.01, and 0.91 
respectively and significantly different from zero. Thus, even when probability 
weighting is ignored, based on the estimates obtained for auctions in Harrison (1989), 
these estimates become smaller in auctions with smaller ambiguity levels (with 
human bidders and prior experience or Nash bidders).  
   The estimates for 
lk  
are approximately close to 1 in models where loss aversion is 
allowed except for auctions against risk-neutral-Nash bidders in Harrison (1989) 
where the estimate is smaller than 1 and significantly different from zero.  
    The implied ratio of loss-gain utility is therefore close to 2. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1991)
51
 suggest a ratio of 2:1 for the “gains” and “losses” based on acceptable lottery 
gambles.
52
 The estimates I obtain suggest that the ratio of “gain-loss” utility is 
qualitatively similar to that observed in Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and reported 
                                               
51 “…these findings suggest that a loss aversion coefficient of about two may explain both risky and 
riskless choices involving monetary outcomes and consumption goods” (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991, p.1053) 
52 As mentioned earlier, not winning the auction does not result in monetary “losses”; thus a ratio of 




elsewhere (Ho, Lim and Camerer, 2006).
53
 Note that my model with linear 
probability weighting and 1lk   is equivalent to a model with risk-aversion with 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 0.5. This similarity is supported by the estimates obtained 
for   and 
lk , in auctions with least ambiguous circumstances. However, unlike the 
model based on risk-aversion (constant relative risk-aversion or CRRAM) alone, the 
general prospect theory model, can address changes in ambiguity levels; the estimates 
for probability weighting obtained across these auctions, are consistent with how 
individuals respond to changes in underlying circumstances.   
     In the following section, I state the results based on differences in estimates for   
and 
lk  
obtained in auctions with prior bidding experience and/or against Nash risk-
neutral bidders; in section 7, I further discuss the implications of my results in the 
context of related literature. 
6. The effect of bidding experience and type of opponent bidders 
Ambiguity-aversion has attracted attention because individuals are typically not 
aware of precise probabilities in the real world. In auctions, the probability of 
winning for a given bid depends on bidders’ bidding strategies, which is not readily 
known in most induced-value auctions. Clearly, deriving probabilities in these 
auctions is a complicated task, and therefore ambiguity could affect bidding as in 
other market experiments (Sarin and Weber 1993, Salo and Weber 1995). As people 
become familiar and gain experience of bidding, deriving probabilities of various 
                                               
53 The estimated coefficient for loss aversion makes my model equivalent to a model with risk-aversion 
coefficient of 0.5 without nonlinear probability weighting; the generality due to nonlinear probability 
weighting adds to the explanatory power of my model over a model with risk-aversion alone.  
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outcomes could become easier.
54
 In my model, this could result in smaller deviations 
between subjective and objective probabilities under less ambiguous circumstances. 
The data for auctions where bidders have prior bidding experience and/or face risk-
neutral Nash bidders present an opportunity to explore these effects. Since these 
induced-value auctions are similar, besides variations in experience level and the 
nature of opponent bidders, as a preliminary hypothesis one could argue that changes 
in the underlying circumstances (ambiguity) are not likely to affect the degree of loss 




 In this section I discuss the experimental 
evidence which supports my hypothesis and suggests minimal role for non-linear 
probability weighting in auctions characterized by less ambiguous circumstances. 
Based on my discussion above, I propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: (a) The deviations between weighted and objective probabilities become 
smaller as auctions environments become less ambiguous, i.e, 
 exp exp exp
humanrivals humanrivals RNNrivals
in erienced erienced erienced     
whereas (b) the coefficient of loss-gain utility 
lk  
is similar across auction 
environments. 
                                               
54 Such expertise is likely to develop faster in other contexts, e.g., in games of chance. 
55 Loss aversion may vary across commodities (Horowitz and McConnell 2002, Koszegi and Rabin 
2006) and could potentially depend on availability of substitutes and trading intentions (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler 1990; List 2003). 
56 The assumption in Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), which suggests that probability weighting and 
loss aversion are independent, is too simplistic. There is some literature that suggests that probability 
weighting and loss aversion could be related. Intuitively it is plausible that loss aversion could become 
smaller in less ambiguous circumstances (Chambers and Melkonyan 2008, Plott and Zeiler 2005).  
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Since my hypothesis pertains to both loss aversion and probability weighting, I shall 
focus only on the results from the general model to explore the effect of prior bidding 
experience against experienced human and risk-neutral Nash bidders
57
.  
I first test the following hypothesis for (gradient of) loss aversion using a generalized 
likelihood ratio test: 
, ,
0 1 0: , :
i g j h
l lH k k H Not H  
where i,j=level of experience and g,h=nature of bidders. Then I test the following 
hypothesis for probability weighting:  
0 1 0: ; :
g h
i jH H Not H   
If the first test does not reject the null hypothesis, I test the following hypothesis for 
probability weighting under the assumption that loss aversion remains the same for 
robustness: 
0 1 0: | ; :
g h g h
i j li ljH k k H Not H    
The likelihood ratio has a 2
r  
distribution where r  is the number of restrictions 
imposed in the null hypothesis. On the basis of these tests (see Table 6), I obtain the 
following result (figures 1-5 in appendix for bidding functions and probability 
weighting functions, which are based on the estimates listed in Table 5, supplement 
the results below). 
 
Result 1.A: (-Less convex probability weighting due to experience-) Prior bidding 
experience reduces the non-linearity of probability weighting in auctions (i) against 
                                               
57 Going by the sum of squared residuals (SSE) alone, the restricted versions of the general model do 
not throw unambiguous evidence in favor of one approach over the other. As observed earlier, the 
similarity of estimates suffer, when either of these influences on behavior is ignored. 
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experienced human bidders and (ii) against risk-neutral Nash bidders. This yields 
smaller deviations between subjective and objective probabilities of equilibrium 
auction outcomes.  
 
This result addresses the effect of prior experience on bidding in auctions which 
present successively smaller levels of ambiguity as opponents change from (i) 
experienced human bidders to (ii) risk-neutral Nash bidders.  
First, I shall address the former auctions. The estimates for   are smaller in these 
auctions with 4 bidders and prior bidding experience (compared to auctions with 
bidders without experience) in Harrison (1989) and Cox et al. (1982). This decline is 
significant at the 1% level for auctions in Harrison (1989) and not significant for 
auctions with 4 bidders in Cox et al. (1982) (see Table 6). In auctions with 5 bidders, 
the increase in the estimate for 
 
for experienced bidders in Cox et al. (1982) 
contradicts my hypothesis but is not significant. If prior experience is expected to 
reduce deviations with respect to the risk-neutral Nash bid then the deviations 
obtained in auctions with 5 bidders belies the expectation, which parallels the 
movements obtained for   .  
    Next, in auctions against risk neutral Nash bidders (Harrison 1989), bidders have 
prior bidding experience as well. Thus, of all auctions under consideration, bidding in 
these auctions occurs in least ambiguous circumstances. In these auctions, the decline 
in the estimate for   as compared to auctions without prior bidding experience is 
significant. This supports my primary hypothesis about the effect of ambiguity on 




Result 1.B: (-Less convex probability weighting due to fixed opponents’ 
strategies-) In auctions with prior bidding experience against risk-neutral Nash 
bidders, fixing the opponents’ bidding strategies reduces the non-linearity of 
probability weighting (with and without loss aversion). This yields smaller 
deviations between subjective and objective probabilities of equilibrium auction 
outcomes.  
 
While the previous result compares the estimates for   with prior bidding 
experience, the auctions against risk-neutral Nash rivals differ from the auctions with 
human opponent bidders (with same experience levels) since the opponents bidding 
strategies are fixed. The focus of previous attempts (Salo and Weber 1995) to explain 
aggressive bidding relates to the ambiguous circumstances arising due to uncertain 
behavior of opponent bidders. The extra control in bidding against risk-neutral Nash 
bidders allows us to examine the implications for   using my approach. As before, in 
auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders (Harrison 1989), the decline in the estimate 
for   as compared to auctions against human bidders, is significant.  
Thus, so far, as we move from auctions with inexperienced bidders to auctions with 
experienced bidders and risk-neutral Nash opponent bidders, the estimates of   
display significant downward movement with successively smaller levels of 
ambiguity. It is therefore appropriate to reflect on the role of ambiguity attitudes in 





Result 1.C: (-Linear probability weighting in least ambiguous circumstances-) In 
auctions, with prior bidding experience, against risk-neutral Nash bidders, by 
allowing loss aversion, an almost linear probability weighting is obtained. 
 
Without loss aversion, although non-linearity of probability weighting declines with 
successively smaller levels of ambiguity, the deviations between subjective and 
objective probabilities remain.  However, with loss aversion, I obtain almost linear 
probability weighting which suggests that aggressive bidding can be rationalized by 
loss aversion alone without invoking ambiguity effects.  
I shall now turn to the estimates for loss aversion observed in various auctions.  
 
Result 2.A: (-No effect on loss aversion due to experience-) Prior bidding 
experience has no effect on loss aversion in auctions against experienced human 
bidders.  
 
Result 2.B: (-Loss aversion declines in least ambiguous circumstances-) The 
degree of loss aversion obtained in auctions with prior bidding experience against 
risk-neutral Nash bidders is smaller than that obtained in auctions with human 
opponent bidders. 
 
The estimates for 
lk  
are almost identical in all the auctions except in auctions against 
risk-neutral Nash bidders, where the estimated gradient for “losses” 
lk  is smaller. 
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This decline is significant when compared to the estimates obtained in auctions with 
human bidders in Harrison (1989). This allows a reflection of the possible 
shortcomings of my approach. In more general field settings, the degree of loss 
aversion may vary across commodities (Horowitz and McConnell 2002, Köszegi and 
Rabin 2006). It may be affected by the availability of market substitutes (Horowitz 
and McConnell 2002) or trading intentions (List 2003, 2004; Kahnemann, Knetsch 
and Thaler 1990). The difference in loss aversion obtained in induced-values settings 
(where the above do not apply) possibly suggests that behavioral influences, other 
than probability weighting and loss aversion, coexist. For example, if bidders display 
spite against human bidders and not against Nash bidders (computers), the differences 
in loss aversion as obtained are expected.
58
  
7. Further discussion of the empirical findings 
 In this section I discuss the significance of my findings in the context of the 
experimental literature on auctions as well as the experimental literature in general. I 
compare my findings to previous literature that explores probability weighting and 
loss aversion in experiments. 
Several studies on decision under risk show the tendency of subjects to overweigh 
small objective probabilities and underweight medium and large objective 
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Camerer and Ho 1994, Fox and Tversky 
1998, Gonzalez and Wu 1999). This pattern yields an inverted S-shaped probability 
                                               




(when considered in isolation) are also similar to the change 
in estimates obtained in the general model. 
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weighting function as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
59
In the real world actual 
probabilities may not be known precisely. Recent evidence (Barron and Erev 2003; 
Hertwig et al. 2004; Barron and Ursino 2007) suggests that the inverted S-shaped 
curve does not capture decision making under uncertainty where probabilities are 
typically derived through repeated sampling (experience)
60
.This literature suggests 
that individuals underweigh small probabilities under uncertainty, which is different 
from what they do under risky circumstances as reflected in the inverted S-shaped 
probability weighting (Prelec 1998, Wu and Gonzalez 1999).
61
 In an auction 
equilibrium, winning is a rare event for bidders with low induced-values. Thus, the 
estimated convex probability weighting in my models (with or without loss aversion) 
is consistent with this literature. As discussed earlier, this is also consistent with Salo 




The literature suggests loss aversion in various settings and provides experimental 
evidence for choices over trade of mugs, pens, candy bars, subscription for electric 
                                               
59 This function typically intersects the linear probability weighting function somewhere between 0.3 
and 0.4. 
60
 In these experiments subjects were asked to choose among two options; for example, when asked to 
choose between a sure $3 , and $4 with probability 0.8, and $0 with probability 0.2. In one treatment 
the probabilities are specified clearly (descriptive) and in the other the probabilities are derived by 
random sampling of the options (experience-based learning). The proportion of subjects who choose 
the risky ($4 with probability 0.8) option is significantly higher in the treatment with uncertainty 
(experience-induced learning). 
61 In experiments, underweighting of rare events could occur due to sampling errors. For example, 
people are likely to draw rare events less often than objective probability implies, especially if their 
samples are small. Barron and Ursino (2007) find that underweighting of rare events as observed in 
one-shot decisions is robust to removal of unrepresentative samples. This suggests that underweighting 
of rare events in experience-based decisions occurs due to overweighting of most recent outcomes. 
62 In Chen et al. (2007), ambiguity attitudes could get confounded with the pessimistic reasoning that 
applies to symmetric bidders. For example, when a rival’s induced-value distribution is unknown , a 
bidder with low valuation might assume that the rival also makes a similar assumption about his values 
(symmetry). This could produce lower bids in equilibrium. Thus the experimental design in Chen et al. 
(2007) does not separates “ambiguity attitudes” from such ex ante pessimistic reasoning.  
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services, job attributes, sportscards, etc.  (Knetsch 1989, Tversky and Kahneman 
1991, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990, Benartzi and Thaler 1995, List 2003). 
The estimate for the ratio of the slopes of the value function in two domains, for small 
and moderate “gains” and “losses” of money, is about 2:1 (Tversky and Kahneman 
1991).  In a slightly different context, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
investigate loss aversion in a purely deterministic environment. In an experiment, half 
of a group of Cornell students are given a Cornell insignia coffee mug, while the 
other half are not. When mug owners are given an opportunity to trade and 
nonowners are given an opportunity to buy, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
found that the reservation prices for the two groups were significantly different. 
Specifically, the ratio of the median of the reservation price of the sellers to the 
buyers is roughly 2.5:1. My findings are broadly consistent with this literature 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Ho, Lim and Camerer, 2006).
63
 
It is however important to emphasize that doubts have been raised in the literature 
about the robustness of loss aversion as a description of individual preferences. List 
(2003, 2004) provides evidence using field experiments that loss aversion attenuates 
with previous trading experience. Plott and Zeiler (2005) suggest that an endowment 
effect arises due to subject misconceptions (ambiguity) about experimental tasks. 
They suggest that when all known controls for subject misconceptions are employed 
                                               
63 Note however that because loss aversion is modeled slightly differently in my approach, this 
equivalence is not obvious. If ( ) 0; ( ) 0u x x for x x for x      . Therefore, 1lk   . 
Clearly, these estimates suggest 0lk  . My approach rules out very high levels of loss aversion so 
bidding remains acceptable.  
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the WTA-WTP disparity is not observed.
64
 The lessons from this literature suggest 
the following possibilities: (i) ambiguity affects loss aversion; (ii) trading intentions 
could affect choices such that loss aversion disappears and (iii) market experience, 
which could affect both ambiguity and/or trading intentions  and thereby loss 
aversion. My results that are obtained within the context of induced-value laboratory 
experiments add to this literature and provide support along the lines of List (2003, 
2004) which suggest that loss aversion could become smaller in the field. However, 
unlike List (2003, 2004), my results do not suggest that loss aversion will disappear 
completely. This might be due to the complexity of the auction environment. If 
cognitive capital that attenuates loss aversion develops slowly, then such learning is 
likely to be slower in auctions than in other simpler choice/trading environments as in 
List (2003, 2004). My results also suggest that ambiguity could affect loss aversion 
since the estimates for loss aversion are slightly smaller in auctions against risk-
neutral Nash bidders. However, in field auctions, even if ambiguity effects can be 
ruled out, trading intentions could still influence loss aversion. 
65
  
8. Conclusions  
In this chapter, I provide a model of bidding in first-price auctions that combines loss 
aversion and non-linear probability weighting. This approach applies to a wider 
domain of auction environments which differ in terms of levels of ambiguity. In 
auctions against human bidders, missing information about bidders’ risk postures and 
bidding strategies present greater levels of uncertainty (ambiguity) in comparison to 
                                               
64
 Although, recent research  raises doubts about the claims in Plott and Zeiler (2005) (see Isoni, 
Loomes and Sugden  2009 ) 
 
65 This is further explored in Ratan (2009). 
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bidding against risk-neutral Nash (computer) bidders. The analysis of experimental 
auction data suggests that aggressive bidding against inexperienced human bidders 
can be rationalized by anticipated loss aversion and ambiguity effects. Interestingly, 
my approach suggests that ambiguity effects become less relevant as levels of 
ambiguity decline with prior experience in auctions against (i) experienced human 
bidders and (ii) risk-neutral Nash bidders. When loss aversion is taken into account, 
the best-fitting parameters in auctions with smaller levels of ambiguity yield almost 
linear probability weighting.  
However, other behavioral explanations that induce aggressive bidding in these 
auctions may coexist with the influences that are prominent in my approach. For 
example, theoretically, risk aversion could be combined with spiteful preferences 
and/or non-linear probability weighting (ambiguity-aversion) to create a bidding 
response that is observationally equivalent to my approach. However, using this 
approach, in auctions against risk-neutral Nash bidders where ambiguity effects and 
spitefulness could be altogether irrelevant, the obtained level of aggregate risk 
aversion is still very high.
66
 This brings out the advantages of my approach over other 
approaches: it provides a reasonable account of aggregate bidding behavior, and 
addresses the role of ambiguity very well. The declining role of ambiguity effects in 
auctions that present successively smaller levels of ambiguity is consistent with the 
smaller levels of non-linear probability weighting obtained using my approach. This 
enhances the performance criteria for other behavioral approaches that can be applied 
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 For example, using constant-risk-aversion approach and linear probability weighting (similar to that 
in obtained using my approach), the Arrow-Pratt measure for auctions in Harrison (1989) with prior 




in auction environments. Further research is required to disentangle the effects of 
various behavioral influences in auctions to attain this objective.  
More investigation of the indirect effects of ambiguity on loss aversion could possibly 
help refine the Prospect theory based accounts of behavior under risk and/or 
uncertainty. However, attaining these objectives within the complexity of auction 







Chapter 3:  Multi-Dimensional Reference-Dependent 
Preferences in Sealed-bid Auctions: How (most) laboratory 




In the previous chapter, I have shown that money loss aversion could explain 
aggressive bidding in induced-value auctions across auction environments in which 
bidders face human rivals to Nash computer rivals. However, commodity auctions 
also differ from induced-value auctions in the following respect: in commodity 
auctions the auction object is exchanged for monetary bid. This is important because 
transferring insights from laboratory experiments to inform structural models in the 
field can be problematic if individuals are loss averse in various dimensions of the 
consumption space in sealed-bid auctions. Moreover, the findings in the recent 
literature suggest that bidding in lab environments could differ from field settings 
(List 2003, 2004). We investigate the theoretical implications of reference-dependent 
preferences in commodity auctions (which are different from induced-value settings 
in the consumption space) and could therefore have altogether different effect on 
bidding in field settings as discussed in List (2003, 2004).  
Differences in moral considerations, the nature and extent of scrutiny, (social) 
context, subject pool, and differences in stakes have recently received increasing 
interest in the literature (e.g., Harrison and List 2004; Karlan 2005; Levitt and List 
                                               
 Coauthored with Andreas Lange: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, Vol. 68(2), pp 634-645 
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2007a, 2007b) that could make transferring qualitative insights from the lab to field 
settings problematic. However, we argue that the nature of the traded commodities 
forms another significant difference between most laboratory and field settings:
67
 in 
most laboratory auction experiments both the induced-value of the item as well as the 
bids are measured in monetary units and therefore along a single dimension from the 
perspective of bidders.
68
 In almost all field settings, however, the auctioned item and 
payments form different dimensions of the consumption space.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that qualitatively different bidding behavior may result 
from these different dimensionalities of the relevant consumption space. For this, we 
explore first- and second-price auctions when bidders are loss averse. The 
phenomenon of loss aversion is well established in the experimental literature (for 
summaries, see Knetsch et al. 1991; Camerer 1995; Horowitz and McConnell 2002). 
We use a reference-dependent utility model with loss aversion based on Köszegi and 
Rabin (2006):
69
 after placing the bid, bidders expect to win the auction with some 
probability and therefore compare the outcome of the auction with this reference 
point. Our model predicts overbidding in induced-value experiments, but 
substantially different bidding behavior when a non-monetary item is auctioned. Our 
                                               
67 Harrison and List (2004) point out that this difference can be essential: “If the nature of the 
commodity itself affects behavior in a way that is not accounted for by the theory being applied, then 
the theory has at best a limited domain of applicability that we should be aware of, and at worse is 
simply false” (p.1012). 
68 The winning bidder receives the (induced) value which was randomly assigned to him minus the 
auction price (his bid in the first price auction; the highest bid of an opponent in the second-price 
auction). 
69 The reference dependence or status-quo bias of choice behavior has received considerable attention 
in the literature. It is usually discussed in a multi-dimensional setting, e.g. when describing differences 
in willingness-to-pay willingness-to-accept (see, e.g. Coursey et al. 1987; Knetsch 1989; Knetsch et al. 
1991; Kahneman et al. 1990; Bateman et al. 1997). Köszegi and Rabin (2006) provide a model with an 
endogenous determination of the reference point.  
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results thereby have implications for the interpretation of laboratory data as well as 
for transferring qualitative insights on bidding behavior to the field.  
The predicted overbidding in first-price sealed-bid auctions with induced-values is 
consistent with experimental findings which suggest that bidders in such auctions 
consistently bid in excess of the predictions of the risk-neutral-Nash (RNNE) model 
(Kagel 1995; Cox et al. 1982, 1988; Harrison 1989).  This overbidding anomaly has 
drawn considerable attention because explaining overbidding by risk-aversion would 
require bidders to be excessively risk-averse (Kagel 1995). Therefore, many 
alternative behavioral models have been suggested (e.g., Salo and Weber 1995; 
Goeree et al. 2002; Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis 2003; Dorsey and Razzolini 2003; 
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007).
70
   
Our model of loss aversion provides one additional explanation for overbidding. 
Naturally, all the above behavioral motivations could exist simultaneously such that 
we do not intend to propose loss aversion as the single cause of overbidding. We 
focus the model on loss aversion only to demonstrate qualitative differences between 
induced-value and commodity auctions.  
Besides in first-price auctions, our model also predicts qualitative differences in 
second-price auctions. Here, loss aversion leads to truthful revelation of the 
underlying induced-value, while overbidding or underbidding may result if the 
                                               
70 Goeree et al. (2002) study noisy bidding behavior in a quantal response equilibrium along with non-
linear probability weighting and joy of winning as potential causes of overbidding. Dorsey and 
Razzolini (2003) compare auctions and lotteries and show that subjects’ overbidding is consistent with 
a misperception of probabilities of winning in auctions. Salo and Weber (1995) consider ambiguity-
aversion and Morgan et al. (2003) studies spiteful preferences as explanations for overbidding. Filiz-




auction item and payments form two different dimensions of the consumption space. 
It should be noted, however, that there is some experimental evidence for bid-shading 
even in induced-value second-price auctions (Kagel 1995; Kagel and Levin 1993). 
Our model is not able to predict such behavior.
71
 Bidding above or, less often, below 
a subject’s own value is typically explained by a lack of familiarity with the second-
price format and weak learning feedback mechanisms (Kagel et al. 1987; Kagel and 
Levin 1993; Harstad 2000).
72
  Similarly, the extent of over- and underbidding is 
reduced when bidders have time to introspect their actions (Aseff 2004). While not 
addressing such bid-shading, our theory predicts potential qualitative differences in 
bidding behavior in induced-value vs. commodity auctions. 
Out theory thereby indicates that findings on bidding behavior obtained in induced-
value experiments cannot necessarily be transferred to the field because of the multi-
dimensionality of the product space.
73
 Even though we demonstrate this 
dimensionality effect using a specific reference-dependent model in an auction 
setting, our findings more generally raise some concerns for transferring qualitative 
behavioral findings from the lab to the field. With this, we add to the current debate 
                                               
71 It should be noted that this is standard for most of the behavioral literature cited above: while models 
are explain overbidding in first price auctions, they generally do not affect the dominant strategy in 
second-price auctions. Exceptionally, a joy of winning hypothesis would be able to generate 
overbidding in second-price such auctions.  
72 Harstad (2000) shows that bidders with experience in English auctions may indeed bid closer to the 
Nash prediction than inexperienced bidders. In typical second-price lab experiments with a small 
number of bidders and uniform distribution of values, such information feedback is rather weak. 
Bidders are therefore less likely to be punished for overbidding, i.e. the chance of winning while 
paying a price which is still above the player’s value is rather small.  
73 It should again be noted that we do not claim that our behavioral assumption is able to serve as the 
single explanation of bidding anomalies in first- and second-price auctions. However, many subjects 
probably combine risk-aversion and potentially loss aversion with other behavioral motivations as 
discussed above. In this sense, our reference-dependent framework is sufficient to point out potential 
differences in qualitative model predictions between lab and field environments. 
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on the link between lab and field settings (e.g., Harrison and List 2004; Levitt and 
List 2007a, 2007b; List 2003).  
Our paper is structured as follows. We first lay out the underlying assumptions of our 
reference-dependent model in section 2. In section 3, we then examine the 
implications of loss aversion in auction settings where object and bids are valued 
along the same dimension or – alternatively – along separate dimensions. We study 
first-price auctions in section 3.1, second-price auctions in section 3.2, and then 
compare the revenues in section 3.3. We conclude by discussing the implications for 
the interpretation of laboratory data.  
2. Loss aversion and reference-dependent preferences  
Loss aversion as a cause for behavioral anomalies is widely discussed in the literature 
(e.g., Knetsch et al. 1991; Camerer 1995, Horowitz and McConnell 2002). Diverse 
studies show large disparities between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-
accept (WTA). As a stylized fact, the discrepancy is largest for non-market goods, 
smaller for ordinary induced goods, and smallest for money-valued items in 
experiments (Horowitz and McConnell 2002, Camerer 1995). Consistent with this 
finding, List (2003) indicates that experience and therefore the frequency of trades of 
a specific commodity can reduce the endowment effect. 
Endowment effects and the WTA/WTP gap can be explained by reference-dependent 
preferences, i.e. where the valuation of the final outcome depends on the reference 
point and subjects are averse to “losses”.  In their prospect theory, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991) describe preferences by indifference curves with a kink at the 
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reference point. This reference point is often assumed to be the status quo 
consumption level, given by the endowment. However, if bidders are endowed with a 
lottery, i.e. face uncertain payoff consequences, “gains” and “losses” must be 
compared to this lottery as a reference point. Sugden (2003) and Köszegi and Rabin 
(2006) provide models allowing for such lotteries as reference points.  
We apply Köszegi and Rabin’s (2006) framework to auction environments.  After 
placing a bid, bidders basically face a lottery of winning or losing the auction. The 
probabilities and potential payoffs depend on their own and other bidders’ bids. The 
final outcome is then evaluated with respect to any possible outcome from this lottery 
as a reference point.  
Formally, we consider 1k   commodities, including a numeraire commodity 0 . An 
individual’s utility ( | )u c r  depends both on her consumption 
0 1( , )
kc c c    and 
her reference level 
0 1( , )
kr r r   . Consistent with Köszegi and Rabin (2006), 
we assume that utility is additively separable in the numeraire and the remaining 
dimensions: 
0 0 0 1 1 1( | ) ( | ) ( | )u c r u c r u c r       (1) 
Defining the consumption utility as ( ) ( | )t t t t tv c u c c  ( {0,1}t ), we assume 
( | ) ( ) max[0, ( ) ( )]t t t t t t t t t tu c r v c v r v c       (2) 
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The parameter 0t   hereby measures the degree of loss aversion in dimension t . It 
directly relates to the ratio of loss-gain-utility given by (1 ) /1 t . As a perhaps more 
familiar measure for loss aversion, the WTA/WTP-ratio is – at the margin –given by
0 1/ (1 )(1 )WTA WTP     .
75
 The finding that the ratio varies widely and depends 
on good characteristics
76
 implies the 
1  will depend on the specific auction item. 
Ex ante, both reference levels and consumption could be stochastic. Following 
Köszegi and Rabin (2006), the reference level is a probability measure G  over 
1k
 
and consumption is drawn according to the probability measure F  over 
1k
. Then, 
the individual’s expected utility over risky outcomes is given by 
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )U F G u c r dG r dF c    (3) 
                                               
74 For the case of two dimensional commodity space, this specification would lead to indifference 
curves with kinks at the reference level which reflects reference-dependence or status quo bias (see 
Knetsch et al. 1991). 
75 For a fixed reference point, the WTP for a small increase in consumption   is determined by 
0 0 0 1 1 1( | ) ( ( ) | ) ( | )u r r u r WTP r u r r       such that 
1 1 0 0 0'(0) '( ) /((1 ) '( ))WTP v r v r  . The WTA is given by 
0 0 0 1 1 1( | ) ( ( ) | ) ( | )u r r u r WTA r u r r      such that 1 1 1 1 0'(0) '( )(1 ) / '( )WTA v r v r  . 
At the margin, the WTA/WTP ratio is therefore given by 
0 1'(0) / '(0) (1 )(1 )WTA WTP     . 
76 The ratio tends to be smaller the closer the good comes to an ordinary induced consumption good 
(Horowitz and McConnell 2002). For money lotteries, they find a ratio close to 2. However, there is 




Bidders are assumed to have rational expectations in the formulation of reference and 
consumption probability. That is, the reference point is endogenously determined.
77
  
In our application to an auction setting, the bid affects a bidder’s chances to win the 
auctioned item and – in the first-price auction – her consumption of the numeraire in 
case of winning. By placing a bid, the bidder therefore not only changes the 
distribution of consumption levels ( F ) but also generates the reference distribution (
G ). The individual undertakes no further action after placing the bid. Rational 
expectations therefore imply F G  such that the bidders solves the following 
program: 
max ( | )F U F F .     (4) 
Note that the temporal structure is slightly different from Köszegi and Rabin (2006). 
In their case, bidders correctly anticipate their actions which take place after new 
information is received. The ex ante payoff distribution which incorporates these 
anticipated actions then forms the reference distribution. As a consequence, actions 
take place after a reference distribution has been formed and new information is 
received. Given a reference distribution G  the bidder therefore chooses ( )F G  to 
maximize ( | )u F G . Rational expectations then require consistency of the 
consumption distribution with the formulation of the reference distribution, i.e. 
( )F G G .   
In a sealed-bid auction, however, bidders’ bids directly affect their payoff 
distribution. After placing the bid, a rational bidder’s payoff expectations, i.e. her 
                                               
77 Alternative reference-dependent models with endogenous definition of reference points are given by 
Sugden (2003) and Munro and Sugden (2003) who assume the reference to be given by the current 
endowment which might adjust over the time.   
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reference distribution, directly depend on her action (bid) and her beliefs of rivals’ 
bidding strategies in equilibrium. Compared to these payoff expectations, bidders 
then realize the auction outcome and potential loss sensations when the auction 
results are announced.
78
 It is therefore natural to assume that the bidders anticipate the 
effects of bidding on both the reference as well as payoff distribution, i.e. that both 
are chosen at the same time. Rational expectations require that they coincide as in 
optimization program (4). 
3. The auction environment  
We consider n  bidders 1,...,i n . We assume symmetric preference structures as 
given in the previous section. For simplicity, bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral in 
the numeraire consumption, i.e. 
0 0 0( )v c c . We study two different auction 
environments: a commodity auction (CA) where a consumption bundle 
k  is 
auctioned off, and an induced-value auction (IV) where values of the auction item are 
induced in the numeraire (money) dimension. While (CA) resembles a naturally- 
occurring auction setting with homegrown values, the (IV) auction characterizes most 
of laboratory auction environments.  
In the commodity auction, the value of the auctioned item 
k  for bidder i  is 
measured in consumption utility gains 
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0
i i iw v c v c      where 1
ic  denotes 
the initial endowment of bidder i . Differently in the induced-value auction, 
iw  is 
directly induced as gain in the money dimensions. In both cases we assume that each 
                                               
78 The model thereby rests on the assumption that between placing the bid (or planning to place the 
bid) and the final realization of the auction outcome, a reference distribution is established 
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bidder knows her induced-value iw  and is informed that others’ values are drawn 
from a distribution ( )H   defined over [ , ]w w  ( 0w w  ). 
Bidders can place bids 
00
i ib c   where 0
ic  denotes the available income of bidder i
. Throughout the paper, we assume that the budget constraint is not binding. We 
consider both first- and second-price independent induced-value auctions. 
3.1 First price auctions 
We first consider the commodity auction (CA) where the value of the auctioned item 
for bidder i  is given by 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) [ , ]
i i iw v c v c w w     . If bidder i  places a bid 
0ib  , her consumption in case of winning the auction is given by 
0 1( , )
i i ic b c   , 
while the consumption in case of losing is given by the initial endowment 
0 1( , )
i ic c . 
For a bidder with preferences as given in section 2 (conditions (1)-(4)), the expected 
utility gain from participating in the auction is therefore given by 
1,CA
0 1( , ) ( )( ) ( )(1 ( ))[ ]
i i i i i i i i ib w f b w b f b f b b w        (5) 
where ( )i if f b  denotes the probability of winning of bidder i  when placing a bid 
ib . Besides the expected consumption utility ( )( )i i if b w b , equation (5) comprises 
expected “losses” in two dimensions: (i) (1 ( )) ( ) i i if b f b w : the bidder expects to win 
iw  with probability ( )if b  such that she experiences not winning as a loss with 
probability (1 ( )) if b . (ii) ( )(1 ( ))i i if b f b b : the bidder expects to lose and 
therefore not to pay 
ib  with probability (1 ( )) if b such that she experiences the 
payment of the price in case of winning the auction a loss with probability ( )if b .   
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It should be noted that (5) implies that a non-negative expected utility gain 
1,CA ( , )i ib w  from participating in the auction can only result if 
1 0[1 (1 ( ))] [1 (1 ( ))]
i i i iw f b b f b      . That is, positive bids only will be placed 
by bidders with 
1( ) 1 1/
if b   . If 1 1  , this condition holds for all bidders. If 
1 1  , the condition implies only bidders with a sufficiently large probability to win 
place positive bids.  
As usual, we restrict our attention to symmetric monotonically increasing equilibria in 
pure strategies. In equilibrium, the chances of player i  to win, are therefore given by 
1( )n iH w . With the above argument, positive bids may only result if 
1
1( ) 1 1/
n iH w    . The corresponding threshold value CALw  we define by  
1
1( ) max[0,1 1/ ]
n CA
LH w 
       (6) 
Note that CA
Lw w  if 1 1  . Bidders with [ , ]
j CA
Lw w w  place positive equilibrium 
bids.  
We obtain the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: (commodity first-price auction–CA) The unique monotonically 
increasing symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding function for commodity 
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Proof: see Appendix. 
Without any loss sensation (
0 1 0   ), the bidding function 
1,CA ( )b   given in (7) 
reduces to the risk-neutral Nash bidding function. Loss aversion in money (
0 0  ) or 
in the commodity dimension (
1 0  ) will affect bids.  For example, consider the 
minimum bid 1,CA
1 0( ) max[0, (1 ) /(1 )]b w w      which is generally smaller than the 
minimal value w . More generally we obtain the following results: 
Proposition 2 (effects of loss aversion–CA). Equilibrium bids are decreasing in the 
degree of loss aversion 
0  in the numeraire (money) dimension. There exists 
ˆ0 1w   with 1 ˆ2 ( ) 1nH w   such that for increasing loss aversion 1 0   in the 
commodity dimension, bids are decreasing if ˆw w  but increasing if ˆw w  as long 
as CA
Lw w .  
Proof: see Appendix. 
The comparative statics shows that the impact of loss aversion depends on the 
dimension in the commodity space in which “losses” occur: while loss aversion in the 
numeraire (payment) dimension has an unambiguously decreasing effect on bids, the 
qualitative impacts of loss aversion in the commodity dimension differ across the 
signal range [ , ]w w w .  
Intuitively, increasing the bid increases the potential loss of money in commodity 
auctions such that money loss aversion implies lower bids. Additionally, the potential 
loss of the commodity serves as a “bifurcating” force: If a bidder is likely to win to 
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start with, he can decrease chance of disappointment by increasing probability of 
winning. As a consequence, loss aversion leads to higher bids.  However, if a bidder 
is unlikely to win to start with, he can decrease expectations by further decreasing 
probability of winning, i.e. by bidding lower due to loss aversion. This bid reducing 
effect applies in particular for values with 1( ) 1/ 2nH w   which holds for any given 
value w  if n  is sufficiently large.  
We now turn to the induced-value (IV) auction, where individual values 
iw  are 
directly induced as gains in the money dimension. Here, a bidder with preferences as 
given in section 2 (conditions (1)-(4)), experiences the following expected utility gain 
from participating in the auction: 
1,IV
0( , ) ( )( ) ( )(1 ( ))( )
i i i i i i i i ib w f b w b f b f b w b        (8) 
We again see that positive expected utility can only result if 
0( ) 1 1/
if b   . Similar 
to the commodity auctions, this defines a threshold IV
Lw  for participation with positive 
bids: 1
0( ) max[0,1 1/ ]
n IV
LH w 
   . Bidders with IVi Lw w  who exist if 0 1   can 
gain non-negative expected utility by bidding their own value, i.e. 
i ib w . 
Comparing conditions (5) and (8) we immediately see that the bidding behavior in the 
induced-value auction can be obtained from the preceding analysis of commodity 
auctions by setting CA
1 0   and 
CA
0 0   . In the induced-value auction, “losses” 
occur at a level 
i iw b  if player i  had expected to win but loses the auction. 
Correspondingly, bidders with a small chance of winning can obtain a non-negative 
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utility in IV auctions not only by (i) bidding zero and ensuring zero probability of 
winning, but also by (ii) bidding their own value, i.e. 
i ib w . 
Adapting Proposition 1 we immediately obtain the bidding function for induced-value 
auctions: 
Corollary 1 (induced-value first-price auction–IV). The unique continuous 
monotonically increasing symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding function for 
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The minimal bid is given by 1,IV ( )b w w  and not affected by loss sensation. In 
general, however, we obtain the following result: 
Corollary 2 (effects of loss aversion–IV). Increases in the degree of loss aversion 
unambiguously increase bids in induced-value first-price auctions. Bids are therefore 
more aggressive than in the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.  
Proof: see Appendix. 
In induced-value settings, our model therefore provides one potential explanation for 
overbidding in first-price sealed-bid auctions when compared to the risk-neutral-Nash 
prediction (e.g., Kagel 1995). Loss aversion thereby may complement other 
behavioral driving forces such as: risk-aversion, probability weighting or ambiguity-
aversion (Salo and Weber 1995), or loser’s regret (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). All 
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these different behavioral motivations could exist simultaneously such that we do not 
expect a single one to completely explain the data from laboratory experiments. As 
such, we do not neither anticipate nor intend to show that the described model 
perfectly fits observed data.
79
 Instead, we take evidence for loss aversion from 
numerous choice experiments as a basis for the claim that it may very well also affect 
bidding behavior in auctions. Concentrating on loss aversion, we see our contribution 
in demonstrating potential qualitative differences in bidding between induced-value 
and commodity auctions.  
As such, the effects of loss aversion in the money dimension in the induced-value 
auction are opposite from those in the commodity auction. While loss aversion in the 
money dimension would imply increased bids in the induced-value setting which 
applies in most lab experiments, bids could decrease if the consumption of the 
commodity occurs in a different dimension. The intuition behind this reversal of the 
impact of money loss aversion can be seen when considering how a subject might end 
up experiencing the money loss: in the induced-value setting, the loss (compared to 
expected payoff) occurs when losing the auction. Increasing the bid decreases the 
surplus ( w b ) and therefore decreases the potential loss of money. As a result, 
money loss aversion induces higher bids. This is different in the commodity auction 
                                               
79 Ratan (2008, Chapter 2 above) provides some evidence of the empirical validity of the reference-
dependent approach for explaining data from induced-value laboratory experiments. Using existing 
data from Cox et al. (1982) and Harrison (1989), he finds that loss aversion parameter 
0  between 0.9 
and 1.0 provide the best fit of the reference-dependent model to the respective data sets. The results are 
obtained using separate nonlinear least squares estimations to identify the loss aversion parameter 
based on a symmetric equilibrium bidding function for the different data sets and different number of 
bidders ( {4,5,6,9}n . The best fit loss aversion levels would correspond to a ratio of gain-loss-




setting. Here, the money loss occurs when winning the auction. Therefore, increasing 
the bid increases the potential loss of money in commodity auctions and money loss 
aversion implies lower bids.  
We summarize these results as follows: 
Corollary 3 (lab vs. field environment) Loss aversion has different qualitative 
implications on bidding behavior depending on whether or not payments are made in 
the same dimension of the commodity space as auction item is consumed. If being 
made in the same dimension (induced-value in laboratory setting), increasing loss 
aversion with respect to the numeraire induces bids to be more aggressive, while they 
become more conservative if consumption dimensions differ (commodity auctions).  
This result suggests overbidding in the field cannot necessarily be predicted on the 
basis of overbidding in induced-value experiments. Using a behavioral model of loss 
aversion, this substantiates the observation by Harrison and List (2004) that the 
applicability of theories may be limited if they do not explicitly account for the nature 
of traded commodities.  
3.2 Second-price auctions 
We next consider second-price sealed-bid auctions again first for commodity auction 
where the value of the auctioned item for bidder i  is given by 
1 1 1 1( ) ( )
i i iw v c v c    . Values are again distributed in [ , ]w w  according to ( )H  .  
For given bidding strategies of the other bidders, bidder i ’s probability of winning 
with a bid of 
ib  is again denoted by ( )if b . The payment which bidder i  has to make 
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in this case, is however given by the second largest bid, i.e. the largest bid of a 
competitor and therefore follows the distribution ( )if b . Then, the expected utility 
including the loss sensation is given by 
2,CA
0
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
( )
( , ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





b w b w b w
b
i i i i
b w
b w w p df p p s df s df p
f b pdf p w f b f b

 
    




Here the first term gives the standard expected consumption utility when winning the 
auction. The second term reflects money losses when bidder i  wins the auction and 
has to pay p , while she expected to pay s p . Note that when paying p  
experienced “losses” are given by max[ ,0]p s . Due to the consistency of the 
reference and outcome distribution (see condition (5)), s  is also distributed with 
distribution ( )f s . The third term reflects money losses from winning the auction and 
paying p  when having expected to lose (with probability 1 ( )if b ). Finally, the last 
term again describes the “losses” suffered from not obtaining the auction commodity. 
Condition (10) implies that a positive bid only may result if 
1( ) 1 1/
if b    for 
positive utility gains to be generated. Therefore, we again obtain a threshold value 
CA
Lw  as defined in (6), below which bidders place zero bids or do not participate in the 
auction. Note again that CA
Lw w  if 1 1  , such that partial pooling at zero bids only 
occurs if 
1 1  .  
Bidder i  chooses 
ib  to maximize (11). Differentiating and simplifying (11) yields 
0 0 1
( )
2 ( ) (1 2 ( ))
ib
i i i i i
b w
w b b pdf p w f b         (11) 
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While it is well known that without loss aversion (
0 1 0   ) truthful bidding will 
result, condition (11) shows immediately that bidding behavior changes in our setting 
due to the assumed loss aversion. In particular, underbidding results at the lowest 
valuation (
1 0( ) max[0, (1 ) /(1 )]b w w     ).  
Proposition 3: (commodity second-price auction–CA) The unique monotonic 
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in commodity second-price auctions with loss 
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  if  CALw w   (12) 
and 2,CA ( ) 0b w   if  CALw w .  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Bidders do not truthfully reveal their true value in order to reduce expected losses: the 
chance of experiencing “losses” from not obtaining the auction item can be decreased 
by lowering the reference probability of winning (low bid) or by increasing the 
probability of winning (high bid). From (11) it becomes obvious that the former is 
optimal for small value draws while the latter will result for high value draws. Along 
the money dimension, the effect of loss aversion is less straightforward. However, we 
can use condition (11) to generate the following comparative statics results.  
Proposition 4: (effects of loss aversion–second-price CA) If bidders are loss-
neutral in the money dimension (
0 0  ), bids are larger (smaller) than the value w  
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if 1( ) 1/ 2nH w   ( 1( ) 1/ 2nH w  ).  For money loss averse bidders ( 0 1  ), bids 
decrease in commodity loss aversion 
1  for small valuation (in particular if 
1( ) 1/ 2nH w  ).  Equilibrium bids decrease in the degree of money loss aversion 0  
for sufficiently small values w . In general, they can decrease or increase in 0 . 
Proof: see Appendix. 
Proposition 4 shows that loss aversion in the commodity dimension can both increase 
or decrease bids depending on the signal range. Loss aversion therefore breaks the 
standard result of truthful revelation of values in second-price sealed-bid auctions: for 
high value bidders, overbidding can result, while underbidding is predicted for low 
value draws. 
We now turn again to the induced-value second-price auction. Here, the expected 
utility gain from participating in the auction is given by 
2,IV
0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )
i ib p b
i i i i i
b w b w b w
b w w p p s df s df p f b w s df s 
 




The bracket has the same interpretation as the first two terms in (10) and gives the 
utility gain from winning the auction at price p . Here, “losses” might be experienced 
because the bidder might have expected to pay a smaller price. Similarly, the second 
term describes the “losses” experienced from not winning the auction: the bidder 
might have expected to win at some price 
is b  and therefore suffers “losses” of size 
iw s .   
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       
  (14) 
which shows that, if placing a positive bid, bidders reveal their valuation truthfully 
despite loss aversion. Note, however, that (14) implies that positive expected utility 
can only result if 
0( ) 1 1/
if b    such that bidders with IVi Lw w  will place zero 
bids which eliminate their chances to win.  
Proposition 5: (induced-value second-price auction–IV) The unique monotonic 
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in induced-value second-price auctions with 















   (15) 
Loss aversion at 
0 1   (i.e. Lw w ) therefore has no effects on bidding behavior in 
induced-value auctions. The different finding for commodity auctions (Proposition 4), 
again demonstrates that loss aversion gives one obstacle of transferring findings from 
induced-value settings to naturally-occurring auctions.  
3.3 Revenue equivalence 
To complete the analysis of equilibrium bidding, we finally discuss the potential 
revenue equivalence. For the induced-value auction (IV), Corollary 4 and Proposition 
5 imply that loss aversion does not change second-price bidding but increases bids in 
first-price auctions compared with the risk-neutral prediction. Expected revenues in a 
first-price auction with loss aversion therefore exceed those in a second-price auction. 
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Proposition 6: (revenue comparison–IV) Revenues in a first-price induced-value 
auction are larger than in a second-price auction if (symmetric) bidders are loss 
averse in the money dimension.  
This revenue-ranking is consistent with laboratory findings (e.g., Cox et al. 1982; 
Kagel and Levin 1993).
80
 The effects of loss aversion are different in commodity 
auctions (CA). Here, loss aversion changes bids in both auction formats. We obtain 
the following result on revenues: 
Proposition 7: (revenue comparison–CA) If bidders are not averse to losses in the 
numeraire dimension (
0 0  ), first- and second-price auctions are revenue-
equivalent in the commodity auction. For positive levels of 
0 , first-price auctions 
revenue-dominate second-price auctions.  
Proof: see Appendix.  
The proof relies on the fact that expected utility gains are identical in both auctions 
for any player (equation (5) and (10)). For 
0 0  , this difference in expected utility 
gains between the two auction formats coincides with the difference between 
expected payments and is zero. For 
0 0  , revenue equivalence is not guaranteed. 
Here, expected payments are larger in the first-price than in the second-price auction 
for all values of w . Expected revenues in the first-price auction therefore dominate 
those in second-price auctions in both induced-value auctions and commodity-
auctions.  
 
                                               




In this paper, we discussed the effects of loss aversion with endogenous reference 
points on bidding behavior in first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. We 
demonstrated that it is important to consider the multi-dimensionality of the 
commodity space: The effects of loss aversion qualitatively differ depending on 
whether the auction item is money (induced-value) or some consumption good which 
generates a loss sensation when an individual unexpectedly loses the auction. In 
particular, we showed that loss aversion in induced-value first-price auctions leads to 
bids in excess of the risk-neutral prediction, while underbidding may result in 
commodity auctions. 
The extent to which loss aversion affects bids in commodity auctions, may further 
depend on the characteristics of the auction item. Corresponding to varying ratios 
between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept measures (Horowitz and 
McConnell 2002), we hypothesize that the effects of loss aversion in the commodity 
dimension are most prevalent in auctions of unique items. That is, if more 
opportunities exist to acquire close substitutes, the sensation of loss and therefore 
their impact on bidding behavior might be smaller.  
Our findings put a word of caution on transferring qualitative behavioral findings 
from induced-value laboratory experiments to the field. Besides other differences the 
auction environments (e.g., subject pools, value of traded goods), we find that the 
one-dimensionality of the commodity space in most laboratory experiments in itself 
may be problematic. That is, auction experiments may need to include more than just 
a money dimension in order to better understand economic behavior in the field. The 
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challenge will lie in designing such experiments while still keeping control over the 









Chapter 4: Trading Intentions and Reference-Dependence in 
Auctions: Does Experience manifest through Heterogeneous 
Access to Outside Markets? 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I explored the effect of reference-dependent preferences on 
bidding in auctions. Given the relevance of commodity loss aversion, in this chapter, I 
explore the effect of reference-dependent preferences in the presence of resale or 
procurement opportunities on bidding in commodity auctions.  Such alternatives 
influence trading intentions and therefore are likely to alter the effect of commodity 
loss aversion on bidding.  
The main focus of this chapter is literature which suggests that experience has a direct 
effect on behavioral preferences.  List (2003, 2004) finds that while prospect theory 
applies well to less experienced traders the behavior of more experienced traders 
comes closer to the predictions of neoclassical theory. I explore whether similar 
effects on individual decisions could arise due to other unobservable features (besides 
prior market experience) that mimic experience. I show that heterogeneous access to 
outside markets could alter trading intentions
81
 thereby producing effects similar to 
those that could be attributed to the direct linkage between experience and 
                                               
81 This has been suggested in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, p. 1328), who note "there are 
some cases in which no endowment effect would be expected, such as when goods are purchased for 
resale rather than for utilization." 
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preferences; such possibilities could arise in first-price sealed-bid auctions in the 
field, with anticipated loss aversion.  
Previous literature has discussed the effect of resale (Bikhchandani and Huang 1989, 
Gupta and Lebrun 1999, Haile 2001, 2003, Garrat and Troger 2003 etc) and outside 
procurement prices on bidding in auctions. In Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and 
Haile (2001, 2003) uncertainty over induced-values gets resolved overtime and 
creates opportunities for resale among the participants in the first-stage auction.
 82
 The 
existence of posted prices at which a commodity can be procured outside the auction 
on bidding with reference-dependent preferences has received contemporary interest 
(Shunda 2009, Reynolds and Wooders 2005, Durham, Roelofs and Standifird, 2004, 
Mathews 2003a and Mathews and Katzman 2004). The focus of this literature is an 
eBay type buy-price auction in which the seller offers the commodity to the bidder at 
a given price in the pre-auction stage. I explore a different but relevant scenario 
where access to outside markets is uncertain.  
        In contrast to previous literature on auctions with resale where secondary 
markets have same participants, in my framework, resale opportunities could arise 
due to absence of all interested bidders in the auction. In such a scenario, although 
participants in the primary auction are well aware of absent bidders but might have 
unequal access to them. Thus, opportunities for resale arise due to reasons different 
from induced-value uncertainty or asymmetry between bidders in the first-stage 
auctions. In my framework with procurement outside the auction, the effect of outside 
                                               
82 In Gupta and Lebrun (1999), inefficient outcomes could arise due to asymmetric distribution of 
bidders’ valuation which creates opportunities for resale. 
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markets on bidding is different than in auctions with buy-price
83
 due to the 
simultaneous existence of outside markets to which bidders may have unequal access. 
Such heterogeneous access to outside markets could arise due to differences in prior 
market experience, bargaining ability, transactions costs, time committed to 
resale/procurement effort or other unobservable characteristics.  
           While a formal treatment of how experience affects bidding directly could be 
more challenging, if uncertain market access is interpreted as a proxy for bidder 
experience, it becomes possible to analyze the indirect effects of experience on 
bidding in an auction with outside alternatives. In recent years, following rapid 
advances in internet based communication search and transactions costs have gone 
down drastically thereby expanding the reach of consumers for everyday 
commodities (Lee 1998, Ariely and Lynch 2000) and could potentially affect auction 
outcomes. 
      I analyze the effect of experience on bidding within the context of reference-
dependent preferences to isolate the effect of trading intentions that arise due to 
heterogeneous market access. As shown in chapter 2, anticipated loss aversion can 
explain aggressive bidding in first-price auctions. As discussed in chapter 1, the 
literature on consumer psychology has discussed how consumers get affected by 
reference prices in everyday transactions. Such effects have been discussed in e-Bay 
“buy now” auctions where buy prices are believed to affect bidding decisions 
(Shunda 2009, Dodonova and Khoroshilov 2004, Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2007).  
                                               
83
 In these auctions the primary interest is: (i) how do bidders behave regarding accepting or rejecting 




      In my approach with loss aversion, resale or procurement options affect 
equilibrium bidding such that there is a direct speculative effect on bidding (as in the 
expected utility framework) and forward-looking (anticipatory) behavior influences 
equilibrium bidding by affecting the “attachment” of a bidder to the commodity. Due 
to the additional behavioral effects, deviations arise with respect to the risk-neutral-
Nash predictions. In auctions with resale, “loss aversion” causes underbidding with 
respect to the risk-neutral-Nash prediction. Bidders with highest access over 
favorable prices are least affected by “loss aversion” and therefore bid closer to the 
risk-neutral-Nash than the bidders with smaller access to favorable prices. In auctions 
with procurement, the attachment effect is such that it may cause overbidding 
(underbidding) with respect to the risk-neutral-Nash. Bidders with greatest level of 
market access are again least affected by “loss aversion” and therefore bid much 
conservatively and closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than the bidders with less favorable 
access to procurement prices. Thus, the predictions of my model are qualitatively 
similar to the findings in List (2003, 2004) which suggest that market experience 
attenuates the endowment effect. Since these indirect effects are observed without 
altering reference dependent preferences, it raises the possibility that the effects 
obtained in List (2003, 2004) in field settings may not arise entirely due to direct 
effect of experience on such preferences. 
In the following sections I discuss the modern marketplace that makes outside 
markets relevant for auctions (section 2), describe a model of reference-dependent 
preferences (section 3) and discuss optimal bidding with resale or outside 
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procurement for first-price auctions (section 4). Then I discuss the findings in the 
context of the literature (section 5) and conclude (sections 6). 
2. The Modern marketplace: Multiple trading instruments, 
search and technological innovation 
In contemporary markets, everyday goods and intangible assets are traded via a 
multiplicity of mechanisms like auctions, posted prices and/or decentralized bilateral 
bargaining (chapter 5, Handbook of Experimental Economics). In recent times, lower 
search and transaction costs present a much wider marketplace to an individual 
consumer. Automobiles, government property, electronics, pollution permits, 
spectrum licenses, exploration rights etc are sold via auctions and other instruments in 
many countries.  
  While the simultaneous existence of auctions and posted prices has been discussed 
in the context of eBay buy price auctions, the sale of used cars, electronics and real 
estate through auctions and posted prices are commonplace.
84
 The buy price 
transactions account for a share of between 32% and 49% of the quarterly sales that 
range between $10.6 and $16.2 billion on eBay; sellers choose to augment their 
auction with a buy price in between 30% and 60% of online auctions, and, among 
those auctions with a buy price, between 10% and 40% end with a transaction at the 
buy price (Shunda 2009). A sizable number of 
2SO emissions permits worth millions 
of dollars have been sold both via auctions (spot and advance auctions) and induced 
                                               
84 Also notable among these are the sale of 
2SO emissions permits by EPA in the United States, 
simultaneously through auctions and permit markets 
(http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/buying.html, Schmalensee et al. 1998, Jaskow et al. 1998).   
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markets since 1993 by EPA (Jaskow et al. 1998) until now.
85
 While subsequent resale 
of emissions permits is widely reported by EPA and related literature, the relevance 
of cost reducing technological advances that provide the same services is especially 
relevant for EPA advance auctions.  
The access of individual consumers to outside markets and potentially cost reducing 
technological advances is determined by characteristics like search and transactions 
costs, experience and consumption plans. It is therefore natural that access to outside 
markets affects bidding in auctions. In this chapter, I focus on bidding in auctions in 
the context of outside markets. 
3. A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences 
As before, an individual’s utility ( | )iu c r  depends both on her consumption 
2
0 1( , )c c c   and her reference level 
2
0 1( , )r r r  .
86
 Consistent with Köszegi 
and Rabin (2006), I assume that utility is additively separable in the numeraire and 
commodity dimensions:
0 0 0 1 1 1( | ) ( | ) ( | )
i i iu c r u c r u c r  . The “direct” consumption 
utility  ( ), 0,1it tv c t  
is obtained when realized consumption is the same as the 
reference level, i.e., ( ) ( | )i it t t t tv c u c c , and the individual utility when her 
consumption differs from her reference is defined as :  
( | ) ( ) - max[0, ( ) - ( )]i i i it t t t t t t t t tu c r v c k v r v c     (1) 
                                               
85 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/2009/09summary.html 
86 The consumption bundle for a bidder comprises of the auction commodity indexed by 1 and 
monetary payments indexed by 0. 
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with  0 , 0,1tk t  . tk  
is the scalar which captures the sensation of “loss” when 
less favorable outcomes are realized.
87
 I simplify by assuming that individuals 
experience “losses” only in the commodity dimension and not in money
88
 i.e. 
0 0k   
and 
10 k . 
The Auction environment: I consider an auction that has n  bidders with symmetric 
risk-neutral preferences. I assume that each bidder has the same consumption utility 
0v   for the commodity. Each bidder knows that (i) rivals’ have the same 
consumption utility and (ii) behavioral and/or risk preferences. There exists a resale 
or procurement market to which bidders have heterogeneous access (specified later). 
The auctioneer invites sealed-bids from bidders present at the auction and the 
commodity is awarded to the highest bidder in exchange for her (second highest) bid 
in the first (second) price auction. 
3.1 Stochastic Reference in Sealed-bid Auction 
Ex ante, auction outcomes are uncertain and depend on the rivals’ bidding strategies 
and other characteristics (references). Bidders who anticipate these outcomes may 
develop expectations regarding winning or losing; to the extent winning the auction is 
possible, “not winning” the auction could induce psychological “losses”. Following 
Köszegi and Rabin (2006), the reference level is a probability measure G  over 
2
 
                                               
87 Thus, psychological “gains” are normalized to zero.    
88 This is a suitable description for real world where day to day exposure to monetary transactions 
yields no loss aversion  in money dimension. 
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and consumption is drawn according to the probability measure F over 
2
. Then, 
the individual’s overall expected utility over risky outcomes is given by 
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )U F G u c r dG r dF c    (2) 
As in earlier chapters, I deviate from the Köszegi-Rabin formulation of overall 
expected utility. In an equilibrium (for a sealed-bid auction) captured by a strictly 
increasing symmetric bidding function, the bid determines the probability of winning 
and the consequent auction outcomes for a bidder.  Since no further action that affects 
auction outcomes is possible after placing the bid, the joint probability distribution 
over potential resale/trade and auction outcomes- F  (which is determined by the 
equilibrium bid) defines the distribution over potential consumption outcomes for a 
bidder with rational expectations, and also generates an identical probability 
distribution - G  over (reference) auction outcomes for a bidder with rational 
expectations. Therefore, in an auction with resale or procurement possibilities, an 
individual solves the following program: 
 
max ( | )
F
U F F                                                              (3) 
This specification is similar to the (anticipatory) approach taken in earlier chapters 
and different from the general setting discussed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006). 
 3.2 Heterogeneous access to outside Markets  
Individual bidders have heterogeneous access to prices in resale or procurement 
markets. Such differences may arise due to differences in individual characteristics 
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like experience, bargaining ability, transactions costs etc. among otherwise similar 
bidders. 
3.2.1 Resale outside the auction 
There exists a resale market in which a price t  is offered in exchange for the 
commodity. Let’s consider the equilibrium behavior of an auction winner who pays a 
bid Β with reference-dependent preferences when resale price is uncertain. Consider 
the utility from resale at price t
 
and no resale under the most unfavorable 
circumstances for resale (when no resale at price t
 
is the reference level)  
1( | ) iu resale at t No resale at t t B k v    
( | ) iu No resale No resale at t v B   
Clearly if t  is high enough then 
( | ) ( | )u resale at t No resale at t u No resale No resale at t ; this happens when 
1 1(1 )i it B k v v B t k v       . In such circumstances, trading is optimal. Now 
consider the utility from trading at price t  and not trading under the most favorable 
circumstances for trading (when trading at price t is the reference level) (since there 
is no money loss aversion) 
( | ) iu resale at t resale at t t B   
( | ) iu No resale resale at t v B   
Clearly if t v  , no resale is optimal.   
I assume that there exists a resale market in which only two prices are offered - 
0 m v  or 
1(1 )M v k  in exchange for the commodity. Thus, the exchange prices 
are such that in equilibrium each bidder is willing to exchange the commodity only at 
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the higher price M . However, bidders have heterogeneous access to prices. For a 
bidder, 
i  
is the probability of drawing the higher resale price M which is randomly 
chosen for bidder i  from a distribution H  over the interval [0,1]  
89
 and constitutes 
his private knowledge. It is common knowledge that rivals’ access over resale prices 
is determined independently (randomly) from the same distribution. Thus, 
i  takes a 
higher value for greater access to price M and yields higher probability for resale. 
3.2.2 Procurement outside the auction 
There exists a procurement market in which a price t  is offered in exchange for the 
commodity. Let’s consider the equilibrium behavior of an auction winner with 
reference-dependent preferences when procurement price is uncertain. Consider the 
utility from procurement at t
 
and no procurement under the most unfavorable 
circumstances for procurement (when no procurement at t
 
is the reference level)  
( | )u procurement at t No procurement at t v t   
( | ) 0u No procurement No procurement at t   
Clearly if t  is high enough then 
( | ) ( | ).u procurement at t No procurement at t u No procurement No procurement at t
 
This happens when v t . In such circumstances, procurement is optimal. Now 
consider the utility from procurement at t  and no procurement under the most 
                                               
89 The prices take only two values for simple exposition; alternatively it is likely that bidders with 
greater access draw higher prices with higher probability.  This generalization though useful is not 
required for drawing the main results. 
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favorable circumstances for procurement (when procurement at t  is the reference 
level) (since there is no money loss aversion) 
( | )u procurement at t procurement at t v t   
1( | )u No procurement procurement at t k v   
Clearly if 
1(1 )t v k  , no procurement is optimal.  I assume that there exists a 
procurement market in which only two prices are offered - 0 r v  or 
1(1 )R v k 
in exchange for the commodity. Thus, the procurement prices are such that in 
equilibrium each bidder is willing to procure the commodity only at the lower 
procurement price r . However, bidders have heterogeneous access to prices. For a 
bidder 
i  
is a probability of drawing the higher procurement price R  which is 
randomly chosen for bidder i  from a distribution H over the interval [0,1] . It is 
common knowledge that rivals’ access over prices is also chosen independently 
(randomly) from the same distribution. Thus,
 i
  is defined such that it takes a lower 
value for more favorable access over procurement prices and the probability for 
outside procurement at price r  is 1 i  .  
4. First-Price Auction 
4.1 Auction with resale 
The decision process for a first-price-auction with resale is described in figure 7. 








( , ) ( )(1 )( ) ( ) ( )
( )(1 ( ))(1 ) ( ) (1 )
PT i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
B f B v B f B M B
k f B f B v k f B v
   
  
    
              (4)
 
where ( )if B denotes the probability of winning conditional on bid iB . The first-term 
and second terms are the expected (direct) consumption utility (net of monetary 
payments) realized when the auction is won and the commodity is kept or 
successfully traded. The third and fourth terms capture commodity loss aversion; this 
is realized when the bidder loses the auction but had expected to win and consume the 
commodity or when the bidder trades away the commodity when she expected to 
consume it upon winning. Given the high resale price, the level of access over 
favorable prices which varies for bidders determines the probability of resale. Thus, 
loss aversion affects bidders heterogeneously.  
Note that (4) implies that a non-negative expected utility gain ( , )PT i iB   from 
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                 (4a) 
That is, positive bids will be placed only by bidders with sufficiently large access to 
the high resale price or high consumption utility.  
As usual, I restrict my attention to symmetric monotonically increasing equilibria in 
pure strategies. Let us assume that all opponents of bidder i  bid according to a 
strictly increasing bidding strategy ( )iB   (0,1)i  . When placing a bid 
iB , bidder 
i ’s probability of winning is therefore given by 1 1( ) ( ( ))i n if B H B B  . In 
equilibrium, the chances of player i  to win, are therefore given by 1( )n iH 
 . From 
(4a) the following can be derived: when 
1 1k   , 
1ˆ 0r   
90
and when 
1 1k  , positive 
bids will result only if 1
2
1
(1 ) ( )1
( ) [ ]
1 (1 )









    
 
(this is 
straightforward  from (4a) ). Thus, the corresponding threshold value 1ˆ
r  is implicitly 

















   
 
   (4b) 
Clearly, optimal bidding depends on the degree of loss aversion and access to resale 
prices. Bidders with 1ˆ[ ,1]i r   get non-negative expected utility gain ( , )PT i iB   
and place positive bids.  
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     
  
; when 
1 1k  and 0,i  therefore 0Z  . 
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Maximizing the expected payoff in (4) yields the following monotonic bid function: 
Proposition 1: (-First-price auction with resale-) For a uniform ( )H  , the 
monotonic Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid function for (symmetric) bidders with 
commodity loss aversion is given by  
1 1
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Proof: See Appendix 


















 which is obtained by substituting 
1 0k   in above; it reflects 
the effect of speculation on bidding. Clearly, greater access to high resale price yields 
greater expected overall payoff to the bidder and causes higher bidding. For 
1 0k  , as 
0,i B v   91 
i.e. the bidder with least access to the high resale price bids her 
consumption utility and derives zero expected payoff from the auction. With 
commodity loss aversion, we obtain underbidding compared to the risk-neutral-Nash 
bid function. Since, the high resale price more than compensates for loss aversion  
1(1 )M v k   each bidder anticipates to exchange the commodity at the high resale 
price. Since she will lose the commodity as a result of this exchange she tries to avoid 
                                               
91 This is derived from the bid function using L’ Hospital’s rule. 
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the commodity “losses” by bidding less. Due to loss aversion, as
10, max[0, (1 )]i iB v k     
92
; this reflects that only nonnegative bids are allowed. 
More generally the following is obtained: 
Proposition 2 (-Effect of loss aversion in first-price auction with resale-) 
For a uniform distribution ( )H  over resale prices, commodity loss aversion has a 









Proof: see Appendix. 
The effect of commodity loss-aversion on bids in this scenario is different from 
induced-value auctions without resale where money loss aversion yields overbidding 
(chapter 2) and from commodity auctions where the effect of commodity loss 
aversion on bids depends on induced consumption utility (chapter 3). Intuitively, for 
any given access over resale prices, the bidders are willing to exchange the 
commodity at the high resale price M and anticipate the ensuing commodity loss 
aversion; in the presence of sufficient competition, bidding less aggressively lowers 
their chances of winning the auction and experiencing ensuing commodity loss.  
4.2 Auction with outside procurement  
The decision process for a first-price-auction with procurement is described in figure 
8. 
                                               
92 This is derived from the bid function using L’ Hospital’s rule. 
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Figure 8: Bidding Problem in First-price Auction with procurement intentions 
 
 




( , ) ( )( ) (1 ( ))(1 )( )
( )(1 ( )) (1 ( )) (1 )
PT i i i i i i
i i i i i i
B f B v B f B v r
f B f B k v f B k v
  
  
     
              (5)
 
Where ( )if B denotes the probability of winning conditional on bid iB . The first-term 
and second terms are the expected (direct) consumption utility (net of monetary 
payments) realized when the commodity is won through the auction or the 
commodity is successfully  accessed and exchanged for a price r . The third and 
fourth terms capture commodity loss aversion; this is realized when the bidder loses 
the auction and could not procure the commodity but had expected to win commodity 
through the auction or procure the commodity upon losing. Given a relatively low 
procurement price r , access over procurement prices which varies for bidders, 
determines the probability of procurement. Thus, loss aversion affects bidders 
heterogeneously.  
( , )iv B
Bid 






Note that the reservation overall expected utility for the bidder equals 
1(1 )( ) (1 )i i iv r k v      due to outside procurement possibilities. Thus, (5) 
implies that participation in the auction exceeds the utility from just relying on 
outside procurement only if
               
1(1 ) [2 ( ) 1]i i i i i i iv r B k v f B         
        
(5a) 
Clearly, auction participation matters depends on: 
1k , distribution ( )H  , the number 
of bidders, among others. It is obvious that for moderate levels of loss-aversion, (5a) 
holds for bidders with any distribution ( )H  over prices. Bidders derive expected 
utility greater than the reservation level of utility by bidding above r , for very large 
and small levels of access to prices for any ( )H  and n . 93However, (5a) may not 
hold for intermediate range of 
i under certain ( )H  and n .  
As before, I restrict my attention to symmetric monotonically increasing equilibria in 
pure strategies such that there exists a strictly increasing bidding strategy ( )jB   
(0,1)j   and
1 1( ) ( ( ))i n if B H B B  . 
94
With the above argument, positive bids 












      . 
95
 When ( )H  is uniform and 
2n  , we can guarantee that (5a) holds for all possible bidder types and bidding 
above r is optimal for all 0i  . As noted earlier, this is also true when 1k  is 
sufficiently small as defined in (5a); even under such circumstances, optimal bidding 
                                               
93 This is easily shown by putting 
iB r in (5a) and taking limits as 0,1i  . 
94 In view of the above, therefore some level of generality is lost while deriving the main results. 
95 Note however that bidding r is as good as outside procurement without loss-aversion; however with 
loss-aversion the expectations associated with some positive chances of winning yields less expected 
overall utility than outside procurement. Therefore, it is optimal to bid zero with loss-aversion if the 
chances of winning are not high and outside procurement is possible.  
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depends on the degree of loss aversion and access to procurement prices. Maximizing 
the expected payoff in (5) yields the following monotonic bid function: 
 
Proposition 3:(-First price auction with procurement-) For a uniform ( )H  and 
2n  , the monotonic Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid function for (symmetric) bidders 
with commodity loss aversion is given by  




[ (1 )( )] ( ) [(1 2 ( )) 2(1 ( )) (1 )] ( )
( )
( ) ( )
i i
n n n n
i PT n n
i i






   
 




Proof: See Appendix 



















which is obtained by substituting 
1 0k   in above and 
reflects the effect of (procurement) speculation on bidding. Higher access to the low 
procurement price r , makes winning the commodity in the auction less important and 
causes lower bidding. This is different from before where higher access to the 
favorable resale price causes higher bidding. As 0,i B r    
i.e., the bidder with 
almost certain access to the low procurement price bids only the low procurement 
price r with or without loss aversion.  
Under the circumstances, with loss aversion we obtain overbidding with respect to the 
risk-neutral-Nash bid function.  
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Proposition 4 (-Effect of loss aversion in first-price auction with procurement-) 
For a uniform distribution ( )H  over procurement prices and 2n  , bids are 









Proof: see Appendix 
The comparative static shows that the impact of loss aversion depends on (i) the 
distribution of access to prices and (ii) number of bidders in the auction. Commodity 
“losses” are realized when the bidder loses the auction and could not procure the 
commodity but had expected to (i) procure the commodity upon losing or (ii) win 
commodity through the auction. The first type of losses always induces higher bids. 
The second type of losses could either cause higher or lower bids. If a bidder is likely 
to win to start with, she can decrease chances of disappointment by increasing 
probability of winning. As a consequence, loss aversion leads to higher bids.  
However, if a bidder is unlikely to win to start with, he can decrease expectations by 
further decreasing the probability of winning, i.e. by bidding lower due to loss 
aversion. The overall effect on bidding depends on the net of these effects (this is 
discussed in the proof for proposition 4).  
Nevertheless, for a uniform ( )H  over procurement prices and 2n   , commodity 
loss aversion always induces higher bidding. 
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5. The Role of Market Access  
The heterogeneous access to prices influences bidding in auction with resale or 
procurement possibilities. The risk-neutral-Nash equilibrium bids capture the direct 
speculative effect of prices in outside markets. The deviations from risk-neutral-Nash 
bids arise due to loss aversion  and depend on (i) access to prices in outside markets 
and (ii) the level of competition. The bidders with favorable access to prices bid 
closer to the predictions of the risk-neutral-Nash bids. In general, we obtain the 
following:  
Proposition 5: For a uniform distribution ( )H  of market access over resale 
prices, in (first price) auctions, deviations from risk-neutral-Nash equilibrium 
due to commodity loss aversion decline with greater access to high resale prices 
i.e.  
( ( ) ( ))








Proof: See Appendix 
This applies to first- price auctions. Greater access to high resale price induces lesser 
expectation of retaining the commodity for consumption, which yields a smaller 
effect of commodity loss aversion on bidding in auction. Thus, deviations from the 
risk-neutral-Nash prediction become smaller with greater access to high resale prices. 
Thus, greater access to resale prices affects trading intentions such that the effects are 
similar to those attributed to direct effect of experience on preferences (List 2003, 
2004).   
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In auctions with outside procurement, risk-neutral-Nash yields less aggressive 
bidding. Due to commodity loss aversion, conditional on the (i) number of rivals, and 
(ii) access to prices, bidders could overbid or underbid below the Risk-neutral-Nash 
bids. Thus, unlike in auctions with resale a consistent decline in deviations from the 
Risk-neutral-Nash bidding with access to procurement price may not be observed. 
However, given that bidders with low levels of market access over low procurement 
prices always overbid and bidders above a high level of access could either underbid 
or overbid larger deviations with respect to the risk-neutral-Nash are obtained for 
bidders with very small access to low procurement price. In general we obtain:  
Proposition 6: For a uniform distribution ( )H  over procurement prices and 
2n  , in (first-price) auctions, deviations from risk-neutral-Nash equilibrium 
for bidders with high levels of market access are smaller than the bidders with 
very low levels of market access i.e. 
0 1
lim | ( ) ( ) | lim | ( ) ( ) |
i i
PT i RN i PT i RN iB B B B
 




Proof: See Appendix 
This applies to first-price auctions. I simulate bidding functions for a uniform access 
over procurement prices, and (i) various levels of loss aversion. (See figure 9 in the 
appendix). This proposition is addressed to compare the behavior of bidders with 
relatively high and low access to the low procurement price just like the behavior of 
inexperienced traders with highly experienced traders in List (2003, 2004). Thus, 
greater access to procurement prices affects trading intentions such that the effects are 
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similar to those attributed to direct effect of experience on preferences (List 2003, 
2004).   
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Auctions are the preferred mode of transfer of unique goods and services and 
maximization of seller’s revenue. In recent years, following rapid advances in internet 
based communication, search and transactions costs have gone down drastically 
thereby expanding the reach of consumers for everyday commodities. This is one way 
in which outside markets are more relevant than before. This is especially relevant in 
the context of auction commodities when technological changes could make low cost 
alternatives a possibility in future. Therefore, the framework is relevant for a scenario 
where the auction commodity could potentially become available in future at 
relatively low cost (Schmalensee et al. 1998). Unobservable effort and/or ability to 
innovate or access to such alternatives are likely to be important influences on 
bidding in the presence or absence of other distinguishing characteristics of bidders. 
Such influences matter when the auction commodity is not required for immediate 
consumption and therefore search and/or technological advances are possible. Among 
commodities sold through auctions- real estate, environmental permits, automobiles, 
art, collectibles, spectrum licenses, electronics, debt instruments, exploration and 
extraction rights, are subject to influences that could arise due to outside procurement 
either because they are (i) non-unique and have outside markets (therefore 





  The framework I have presented in this paper addresses the 
effect of such circumstances in auctions. 
         I have explored the effect of resale or procurement outside the auction on 
bidding in a sealed-bid first-price auction. Individuals who participate in auctions 
possess unobservable characteristics like experience levels, bargaining skills, ability 
to innovate etc. that could yield heterogeneous access over prices in resale or 
procurement markets. I explore the effect of differences in trading intentions that 
arise due to heterogeneous access over outside market prices on bidding in auctions. I 
show that bidders with greater access to favorable prices are in the most advantageous 
position such that they bid (i) aggressively in auction with profitable resale 
opportunities and (ii) conservatively in auctions where low cost procurement is 
possible.  
If bidders are loss averse in commodity, there is an additional “attachment” effect on 
bidding. In auctions with resale, loss aversion causes underbidding with respect to the 
risk-neutral-Nash prediction. Bidders with favorable access over prices are again least 
affected by loss aversion and therefore bid closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than the 
bidders with less favorable access. In auctions with procurement, the attachment 
effect is such that it may cause overbidding (underbidding) for bidders with respect to 
the risk-neutral-Nash. Nevertheless, bidders with favorable access over prices are 
again least affected by loss aversion and therefore bid much conservatively and closer 
to the risk-neutral-Nash than the bidders with less favorable access over prices. 
                                               
96 The demand for electronic storage of data is one such example: within last few years the modes of 
storage has changed rapidly.  
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         If access to favorable prices is interpreted as a proxy for experience levels, the 
predictions of my model are qualitatively similar to the findings that suggest a direct 
linkage between experience and preferences (List 2003, 2004). If such heterogeneous 
access is interpreted as proxy for experience then my model captures the indirect 
relationship between experience and bidding. Since these indirect effects are observed 
without altering loss averse preferences, it raises the possibility that the effects 
obtained in List (2003, 2004) may not arise entirely due to direct linkage between 




A.1 Proofs  
Chapter 2 
Proof for Proposition 1 
For ˆ( ),[1 (1 ( ( )))] 0i l l iv v k k f B v     maximizing (5), bidder i  chooses iB  
according to 
' '( )( ) '( )[1 2 ( ) ]( ) ( )(1 ( )) 0i i i ii i i i l i i lf B v B f f B f k v B f f k              
 (A.1) 
Here 1 1( ) ( ( ))i ni if f B F B B
    and therefore 1 1 1'( ) ( ) '( ( ))( ) '( )ni i if B F B B B B
   . In 
equilibrium, we have 1( )i iB B v
  , 1( ) '( ) 1/ '( )i iB B B v
  , and 1( )i n if F v
 . 
Rearranging (A.1) gives 
1 1 1 1'( ) '( ) [1 (1 2 ( ( ))) ] [ ( ( ))(1 (1 ( ( )))) ( )]'n n n ni i i l i l i iF v v F v k F v k F v B v   






[1 (1 2 ( ( ))] ( ( ))
( )







i PT n n
i l i
x k F x d F x
B v









                                                      
(A.3)                                                                                         
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as the unique candidate for a symmetric monotonic bidding equilibrium. 
Monotonicity of ( )i PTB v  can easily be established by differentiating (A.3) and using 
the following:  
for ˆ( ),[1 (1 ( ( )))] 0 [1 (1 2 ( ( )))] 0i l l i l iv v k k f B v k f B v        .  
It remains to show the second-order condition for the maximization problem. Using 
the envelope theorem and (A.1), this is equivalent to 2 ( ( ), ) / 0PT i i iB v v B v     
which holds true since 2 ( ( ), ) / ' '( ( ))[1 (1 2 ( ( )))] 0PT i i i i l iB v v B v f B v k f B v         
since [1 (1 ( ( )))] 0l ik f B v    
Applying L’hospital’s rule to (A.3) yields the bid for lowest induced-value. 
For ˆ( ), ( )i l i iv v k B v v  maximizes payoff (yields zero payoff). 
  
Proof for Proposition 2 (i)    









; for  ˆ( )i lv v k rewrite bid function 
(A.3) as   
1 1
1 1
( ( ))[1 (1 ( ( ))]
( )





i PT i n n
i l i
F x k F x dx
B v v









   (2.1)
 
From above 






den den x x dx v v x k x x dx
k
      

       
    
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where 1 1( ) ( )(1 ( ) ; ( ) ( ( ) ), ( ) ( ( ) )n ni i i l i iden v v v k v F v x F x      
       
. Upon 
expansion and cancellation this reduces to  










   
  
 
. For all 









 .  
Proof for Proposition 2 (ii) 








; for  ˆ( )i lv v k  I show that (i) 










is guaranteed for 0 0.995066lk   
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Now 
   
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Since   ln ( ) 0P v 
   
(3.1) is equivalent to
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( ( )) 1 (1 ( ( ))) ln ( ) ( ( )) 1 (1 2 ( ( )))
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P x k P x P x P x k P x
P v k P v P v P v k P v
k P x P x k P x
k P v P v k P v
   
   
 
 
   

   
   
 
   
    (3.1a) 
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being increasing in x  ; Or equivalently 
 
 











       being increasing in y when 0 1y  ;  
i.e. 
1
[1 (1 )][1 (1 2 )] (1 ) log 0l l l l
T
k y k y k k y
y y

       

                                         
(3.2)   


















 more bidders bid B v  (bid more 
aggressively in response to greater ambiguity).  (ii)  For ˆ( )i lv v k , 







 for 0 1y  .
 







Let 2 2 2( ) 2 3 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) lnl l l l l lZ y k y k k y k k k y y                     (3.3)
 
Then we need to show ( ) 0Z y  for 0 1y   


































] is a strictly monotonically increasing continuous function 







at 1y  . Hence there exists a unique 
*y at which (3.4) holds. Using (3.3) it can be shown that 
2 2 2( *) (1 ) 2 * (1 ) *l l l lZ y k k y k k y     ; rearranging  (3.5) yields  
4 ln *








                                                              (3.5) 
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Again using (3.4) it can be shown that 
*ln *




Z y k k y
 
     
 
. 






k y    
 i.e.  4 ln * *ln *[1 *] 1







.  Suppose ln 4y    then 4y e ; and 
since 





y y y e y y
k
       

. 
Hence ( *) 0Z y   iff  (4 ln *)(2 *ln * 2 *) 2(4 ln * 4 *)y y y y y y        i.e. ,
6*y e     
(3.6)  
From (3.5)  
lk increases as *y decreases.  Thus 
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is guaranteed.  














, if there exists ( 1) 6* ( ) 0.0025ny F v e      ; 








Proof for Proposition 3  








; for  ˆ( )i lv v k  
I show that (i) 










is guaranteed for 0 0.995066lk  .  









( ( )) 1 (1 ( ( )))[ ( ( )) 1 (1 ( ( ))) ]
( ) 0
( ( )) 1 (1 ( ( )))











P x k P x dxP v k P v nnB v
n P v k P v












   
( ( ))
( ( )) 1 (1 ( ( ))) 1 (1 2 ( ( )))l l
P v









( 1)( ( )) ( ( ) ) ln ( ) ( ) ln ( ) ( ( )) 0
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P x k P x dx F x P x k P x dx
P v k P v F x P v k P v
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   
     

   
 
 
Upon multiplying both sides by   we get the same inequality (3.1a). Thus, the rest 
of the proof is the same as outlined above for proposition 2(ii) for various range of 
value for 
lk . The same conclusions follow. 
  
Proof for Proposition 4 
I shall first characterize the interior solution underlying the first-order condition for 
the objective function, assuming a monotonic bid-value relationship exists. Then 
show that (i) the best-response bid-value relationship is strictly increasing for
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ˆ( )l iv k v v   and (ii) the expected payoff is local and global maximum at the 
optimal bid.  
(i) 
1 1 1max ( , ) (( ) ) (( ) )(1 (( ) )) ( )
i
n n n
PT i i i l i i i i
v B v
v B B k B B v B        
 
     
                 
(2.1)                                         
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                       (2.2)          
 
This defines a unique bid for each value.  
For ˆ( ), ( )i l i iv v k B v v  maximizes payoff (yields zero payoff). 
For 










 (ii)  For 0,  ˆ( ),[1 (1 ( ( )))] 0i l l iv v k k f B v     and iv v using (2.2) we 
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( 1) ( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 1) 1
( 1) 2 ( 1) 2
(1 ) (1 )
(1 2 ( ) ) ( 1) ( 1) (1 2 ( ) )
n n n n
l l i i i l l i
n n
i l l i i l l i
k k B B B k k BZ Z
B k k B n B n k k B
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     
   
; For 1lk   , the numerator and 







   
   
. 
Thus the bid-value relationship is strictly increasing for ˆ( )l iv k v v  . 
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(iii) For ˆ( ),[1 (1 ( ( )))] 0i l l iv v k k f B v     
and 
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Proof for Proposition 5 
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Since 2(.) (.) 0D  the above holds if 2( 1) (.) ( 1) (.)(1 )l ln D n k k     . Note that 
this holds when 1lk  . When 1lk  , the above is equivalent to 
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When 1lk  , as 0iB   
or 
iB  , the LHS exceeds the RHS ; given the bids and 







; for some   * 1lk k   for iv  
it follows from above, if  
( 1) ln( ) ( )
[1 (1 2 ( ))]
[1 (1 ( ))]
l i i l
l i
l i
n k B B k
k B
k B














Proof: for Proposition 6 
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It is relatively straightforward to show (as shown before in the proof for Prop.5(ii))  
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which can be shown to be equivalent to 
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
Bidders with [ , ]j CALw w w  can only obtain non-negative expected utility by having 
zero chances of winning. This is guaranteed when placing a zero bid. For 
[ , ]j CALw w w , we assume that all opponents of bidder i  bid according to a strictly 
increasing bidding strategy ( )jb w .  
Maximizing (5), bidder i  chooses 
ib  according to 
0 1 0'( )[ (1 2 )( )] [1 (1 ) ]
i i i i i i i if b w b f b w f f           (A.1) 
When placing a positive bid 
ib , bidder i ’s probability of winning is therefore given 
by 1 1( ) ( ( ))i n if b H b b   and therefore 1 1 1'( ) ( ) '( ( ))( ) '( )i n i if b H b b b b   . In 
equilibrium, we have 1( )i ib b w  , 1( ) '( ) 1/ '( )i ib b b w  , and 1( )i n if H w .  
Rearranging (A.1) therefore immediately gives 
1 1 1 1
1 0( ) '( ) [1 (1 2 ( )) ] [ ( )(1 (1 ( )) ) ( )]'









[1 (1 2 ( ))] ( )
( )







z H z dH z
b w









 for [ , ]CALw w w  (A.3) 
as the unique candidate for a symmetric monotonic bidding equilibrium. Partial 
integration leads to (7). Strict monotonicity of ( )b w  in [ , ]CALw w w  can easily be 
established by differentiating (A.3). It remains to show the second-order condition for 
the maximization problem for [ , ]CALw w w . Using the envelope theorem and (A.1), 
this is equivalent to 2 1,CA 1,CA( ( ), ) / 0b w w b w      which holds true since 
2 1,CA 1,CA 1,CA 1,CA
1( ( ), ) / '( ( ))[1 (1 2 ( ( ))) ] 0b w w b w f b w f b w         . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Differentiating 1,CA ( )b w  with respect to 0  for [ , ]
CA
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  (A.4) 
while  
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 for small w , in particular those with 
1( ) 1/ 2nH w  . At w w , however, we obtain (with partial integration) 
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 for ˆw w . With (A.5), this 
threshold value is given by 
ˆ




z H z dH z   . Note that this implies 
1 ˆ( ) 1/ 2nH w  .  
Proof of Corollary 2. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Bidders with [ , ]j CALw w w  can only obtain non-negative expected utility by having 
zero chances of winning. This is guaranteed when placing a zero bid. For 
[ , ]CALw w w , we differentiate condition (11) with respect to w  ( ( ) ( )






1 '( )[1 2 ( ) '( ( ))] (1 2 ( ( ))) 2 '( ( )) '( )
'( )[1 ] 2 ( )( ( )) ' (1 ) 2 [ ( )]'n n
b w b w f b w f b w wf b w b w
b w b w H w wH w
  
   
     
    
 
 (A.8) 
Solving the affine linear differential equation (A.8), we obtain  
1




21 2 ( ( )) '
( ) exp ( ( ) ( ))
1 1
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zH z
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as the unique candidate for a symmetric monotonic bidding equilibrium for 
[ , ]CALw w w . Noting that (11) implies 
2,CA
1 0( ) max[0, (1 ) /(1 )]
CA
Lb w w     , partial 
integration yields (13). Monotonicity of 2,CA ( )b w  for [ , ]CALw w w  is easily be 
established by differentiating (A.9). It remains to show the second-order condition for 
the maximization problem for [ , ]CALw w w . Using the envelope theorem, this is 
equivalent to 
2







 or – using condition (10) – equivalently 
1'( ) 1 (1 2 ( )) 0
i if b f b      which obviously holds true in the relevant range. 
Proof for Proposition 4 
We first rewrite (11) as: 
2,CA 2,CA 1 1





w b w b z dH z w H w         
 (A.10) 
At 




1( ) [1 2 ( )]
nb w w w H w         
which implies bids above the valuation for 1( ) 1/ 2nH w   and below value for 
1( ) 1/ 2nH w   when 0 0  . 
For general 
0 , differentiating (A.10) with respect to 1  yields  
2,CA 2,CA 1 1
0 0
1 1






b w b z dH z w H w 
 
     
 
   
which immediately proves 2,CA
1






Lw w  as long as 
1( ) 1/ 2n CALH w
  .  
This also implies 2,CA
1





 for all CA
Lw w  with 
1( ) 1/ 2nH w  . For 
CA
Lw w , we naturally have 
2,CA
1






Furthermore, differentiation with respect to 
0  gives 
2,CA 2,CA 2,CA 1 2,CA 1
0 0
0 0
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Lw w .  For 
CA
Lw w , again 
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In order to see that money-loss aversion can increase bids for large values, consider 
the derivative at 
0 1 0   : 
2,CA 2,CA 2,CA 1 1
0






b w b w b z dH z w zdH z






which immediately shows that the sign of the derivative depends on the distribution 
1( )nH   , thereby completing the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7:  
It is sufficient to show that expected payments made by a player with value w  
coincide in both auctions. They are given by 1( ) ( )nH w b w  in the first-price auction, 




b z dH z  in the second-price auction. Reconsidering the expected 
utility gains in (5) and (10), we obtain: 
1,CA 1,CA 2,CA 2,CA
1 1 1,CA 2,CA 1
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 (A.13) 
The probability of winning with a given type w  is 1( )nH w  in both auctions. 
Therefore, the first-order conditions (6) and (11) combined with the envelope theorem 
imply that 
1,CA 1,CA 1 1 1
1
2,CA 2,CA
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))






b w w b z z dz H z H z H z dz
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  (A.14) 
Combining (A.13) and (A.14), we obtain  
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1,CA 1 2,CA 1
2,CA 1 1 1
0 1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
'( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )]
0








b w H w b z dH z













  (A.15) 
which proves that first-price auctions revenue-dominate second-price auctions if 





Proof for Proposition 1 
Bidders with 1ˆ[0, ]i r   can only obtain non-negative expected utility by having zero 
chances of winning. This is guaranteed when placing a zero bid. For 1ˆ( ,1]i r  , I 
assume that all opponents of bidder i  bid according to a strictly increasing bidding 
strategy ( )iB  . Maximizing (4), bidder i  chooses 
iB  according to 
1 1'( )[(1 ) (1 2 )(1 ) 2 (1 ) ] ( )
i i i i i
i i i i i if B v M f k v f k B f B               
 (A.1) 
Here 1 1( ) ( ( ))i n if B H B B   and therefore 1 1 1'( ) ( ) '( ( ))( ) '( )i n i if B H B B B B   . In 
equilibrium, we have 1( )i iB B 
  , 1( ) '( ) 1/ '( )i iB B B 
  , and 1( )i n if H 
 . 
Rearranging (A.1) gives 
1 1
1 1( ) '( )[(1 ) (1 2 )(1 ) 2 (1 ) ] [ ( ) ( )]'
n i i n
i i i i i i i i iH v M f k v f k H B        





























  (A.3) 
 as the unique candidate for a symmetric monotonic bidding equilibrium.  
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1 1
1 1( ) (1 ) (1 2 ( ))(1 ) 2 ( ) (1 )
n ng x x v xM H x x k v H x x x k v         ; thus for 
1ˆ( ,1]i r   
1
1 1 1 1
ˆ
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n n n n
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i iH g g x dH x


      i.e. 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) [ ( )( ) ' ( ) '( )( ) ( ) '( )( ) ( )] 0
i i i
r r r
n n n n
i iH g g x H x g x H x dx g x H x dx
  
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i iH g g x H x dx g x H x dx
 
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'( ) ( ) 0
i
r
ng x H x dx

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'( ) 2 ( ) ' ( )(1 ) 4 ( )(1 )




g x M v k H x x v k H x x v k v




      
    
  
Therefore it suffices to show that 
1 2 1 1[1 ( ) ' ( )(1 ) 2 ( )(1 )] ( ) 0n n nH x x H x x H x dx       . This can be shown to be 
equivalent to 1 1 2 1 2
1
( )(1 (1 ) ( )) (1 ) ( ( )) 0
2
n n n
i iH x x H x dx H dx 
       which is 
always true. Thus the bid function is strictly monotonic.  
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(Sufficiency) It remains to show the second-order condition for the maximization 
problem. Using the envelope theorem and (A.1), this is equivalent to 
2 ( ( ), ) / 0i i iB B        . 
2
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n n




B B H M v k v H
k v H
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2 11( ( ), ) / 0 iff   ( )(1 )) ( )
2
n
i i i i i iB B H Z     
        . For a uniform 
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for 2n  . 
Therefore 2 ( ( ), ) / 0i i iB B        
 
Proof for Proposition 2 
Differentiating A.3 yields 
1 1
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r r
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 Which can be shown to be equal to 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2[(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) 2( ) ( )(1 ) 0n n n ni i iv H H x dx H H x x dx  
            










Proof of Proposition 3 
For [0,1]i  , and uniform ( )H   and  2n   bidders derive expected overall utility 
greater than the reservation expected utility by bidding greater than r . Let us assume 
that all opponents of bidder i  bid according to a strictly increasing bidding strategy
( )iB  . Maximizing (5), bidder i  chooses 
iB  according to 
1 1'( )[ (1 )( ) (1 2 ) 2(1 ) (1 ) ( )
i i i i i
i i i i if B v B v r f k v f k f B               
 (B.1) 
Here 1 1( ) ( ( ))i n if B H B B   and therefore 1 1 1'( ) ( ) '( ( ))( ) '( )i n i if B H B B B B   . In 
equilibrium, we have 1( )i iB B 
  , 1( ) '( ) 1/ '( )i iB B B 
  , and 1( )i n if H 
 . 
Rearranging (B.1) gives 
1 1 1 1
1 1( ) '( )[ (1 )( ) (1 2 ( )) 2(1 ( )) (1 ) ] [ ( ) ( )]'
n n n n
i i i i i i i i iH v v r H k v H k v H B        





























  (B.3) 
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 as the unique candidate for a symmetric monotonic bidding equilibrium.  
























; as before 










if '( ) 0g x   .  
Since 1 1
1 1( ) (1 )( ) (1 2 ( )) 2(1 ( )) (1 )
n ng x v x v r H x k xv H x x x k v         
1 2 1
1'( ) [1 2( ) ' ( ) 4 (1 ( )))]
n ng x v r k v H x x x H x        
. For uniform 2n   and  
uniform ( )H   it follows that '( ) 0g x  . Thus the bid function is strictly monotonic.  
(Sufficiency) It remains to show the second-order condition for the maximization 
problem. Using the envelope theorem and the FOC, this is equivalent to 
2 ( ( ), ) / 0i i iB B       . From the FOC, 
2
1 1( ( ), ) / '( )[ (1 2 ) 2(1 )(1 2 ) ]i i i iB B f B v r f k v f k v                
2
1( ( ), ) / '( )[ (1 4 (1 ))]i i i iB B f B v r k v f             
For 2n   and uniform ( )H  , since v r , 2 ( ( ), ) / 0i i iB B        follows.  
  
Proof for Proposition 4 







































































.  For moderate levels of 
loss-aversion participation in the auction is guaranteed and it can be shown that for a 
















thereby the claim at 
certain places that loss-aversion could cause overbidding or underbidding.
 
Proof for Proposition 5 
In auctions with resale, for first-price auctions, the difference  
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i.f.f. 
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     . For a uniform 
distribution ( )H  , 1 1
1
( )[ ( ( ))(1 ))] 0
2
n nH x H x x dx    since 
11 ( ( ))(1 ))
2
nH x x 
for all 0x  , as shown in the proof for the monotonicity of the bid function in 






Proof for Proposition 6 
In auctions with outside procurement, in a first-price auction with sufficiently small 
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Figure 2: General PT Bid and Probability Function; CRS(1982); n=4 (Inexperienced 
and experienced bidders) 
 
Notes: (1) The right column is a plot of the probability weighting function with and 
without loss aversion. 
 
  





























































































Figure 3: General PT Bid and Probability Function; CRS(1982); n=5 (Inexperienced 
and experienced bidders) 
 
Notes: (1) The right column is a plot of the probability weighting function with and 
without loss aversion. 












General PT Bid N=5:Inexperienced Bidders
 
 

























Probability Weighting N=5:Inexperienced Bidders
 
 












General PT Bid N=5:Experienced Bidders
 
 













































Figure 4: General PT Bid and Probability Function; CRS(1982); n=6 (Inexperienced 
bidders) 
 
Notes: (1) The right column is a plot of the probability weighting function with and 
without loss aversion. 
 


































































































Figure 5: General PT Bid and Probability Function; CRS(1982); n=9 (Inexperienced 
bidders) 
 
Notes: (1) The right column is a plot of the probability weighting function with and 
without loss aversion. 
 
  













General PT Bid N=9:Inexperienced Bidders
 
 






































Figure 6: General PT Bid and Probability Function; Harrison(1989); n=4  
(Inexperienced and experienced bidders); against Human and Risk-neutral Nash 
rivals 
 
Notes: (1) The right column is a plot of the probability weighting function with and 
without loss aversion. 
  


























































































































Figure 9: First-Price Auction with outside Procurement 
Uniform distribution over procurement price r  
1, 0.1, 2v r n    
 
 












































































A.3 Tables  
 
Table 1: Auctions in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) 







fdf2(20) , fdf4 (20) 








dfd9x (10)   
(1) “n” denotes the number of bidders in a first-price auction 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Auctions in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) 




















































































































































Note: (i) Overbid % defined with respect to RNNE i.e. no. of bids above the RNNE (ii) Overbid is 100*(bid-RNNE)/RNNE for each bid above 







Table 3: First-Price Auctions in Harrison (1989) 




Payoff in Dollars 






Total Number of 
Human Bids? 
1 Inexperienced Dollars No 4 320 
1P Inexperienced Points No 4 320 
2 Experienced Dollars No 5 400 
2P Experienced Points No 4 320 
3 Experienced Dollars Yes 14 280 
3P Experienced Points Yes 16 320 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Auctions in Harrison (1989) 













































































Note: (i) Overbid % defined with respect to RNNE i.e. no. of bids above the RNNE (ii) Overbid is 100*(bid-RNNE)/RNNE for each bid above 







Table 5: Prospect Theory Models of Bidding 
Cox, Roberson and Smith(1982) 
No. of Bidders 
(Experience) 
(Rivals) 
No. of Observations 
(PeriodsBidders-
outliers) 



































































































































































































Notes: (1) The General model is based on Proposition 1;allows Nonlinear Probability Weighting and Loss-aversion (2) The PW model allows for 
Nonlinear Probability Weighting (no Loss-aversion)  (3) The LA model allows loss-aversion defined in assumption B (linear Probability 
Weighting) only (4) The RNNE model is based on linear probability weighting where 1   and no loss-aversion (5) Asymptotic Standard 
Errors in brackets (6) SSE: Sum of squared errors based on the difference between actual and predicted bid (7) The estimates are based on search 
algorithms developed using MATLAB for the data described in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) (8)#Overbids beyond Private Values removed; 







Table 6: Hypothesis Tests 
Cox, Roberson and Smith(1982) 
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against Nash bidders 
exp expin
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against  Nash bidders 
 
























1. Ariely, D. and I. Simonson. 2003. “Buying, Bidding, Playing, or Competing? Value 
Assessment and Decision Dynamics in Online Auctions.” Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 13 (1-2), 113–123.  
2. Ariely, Dan and John G. Lynch. 2000: “Wine Online: Search Cost Affect 
Competition on Price, Quality and Distribution.” Marketing Science, 19(1) 83-103.  
3. Aseff, Jorge G. 2004. “Learning to play second-price auctions, an experimental 
study.” Economics Letters 85: 279–286. 
4. Athey, Susan and Philip Haile. 2002. “Identification of Standard Auction Models.” 
Econometrica, 70: 2107-2140.    
5. Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortaçsu. 2005. “Are Structural Estimates of Auction 
Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 113 (4): 703-741. 
6. Barron, G., and I. Erev. 2003. “Small feedback-based decisions and their limited 
correspondence to description-based decisions”. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 16, 215–233.  
7. Barron, G. and G. Ursino. 2007. “Underweighting rare events in experience-based 
decisions: Beyond sample error”. Working Paper 
(www.econ.upf.edu/~ursino/Barron_Ursino_2007.pdf) 
8. Bateman, Ian, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes, Chris Starmer, and Robert 
Sugden. 1997. “A Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 112: 479-505. 
135 
 
9. Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler. 1995. “Myopic Loss Aversion and the 
Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1): 73–92.    
10. Camerer, Colin. 1995.  “Individual Decision Making.” In The Handbook of 
Experimental Economics, ed. John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 501–85. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
11. Camerer, Colin F. 1998. “Prospect theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field.” 
Social Science Working Paper 1037, California Institute of Technology, Division of 
Humanities and Social Sciences. 
12. Camerer, Colin F. and Teck-Hua Ho. 1994. “Violations of the Betweenness Axiom 
and Nonlinearity in Probability.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8: 167-196. 
13. Camerer, Colin F. and H. K. Kunreuther. 1989. "Experimental Markets for 
Insurance." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2: 265-300. 
14. Chambers, Robert G. and Tigran Melkonyan. 2008. “Smoothing Preference Kinks 
with Information”, Working Paper, AREC, University of Maryland. 
15. Chen, Yan, Katušcák, Peter and Emre Ozdenoren. 2007. “Sealed bid auctions 
with ambiguity: Theory and experiments”, Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 513 – 
535. 
16. Coursey, Don, Hovis, John and William Schulze. 1987. “The Disparity Between 
Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 102(3): 679-90. 
17. Cox, James C., Bruce Roberson, and Vernon L. Smith. 1982. “Theory and 
Behavior of Single Object Auctions.” Research in Experimental Economics. Vol. 2: 
1-43. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
136 
 
18. Cox J.C. and Oaxaca R.L. 1996. Is bidding behavior Consistent with Bidding 
Theory for Induced Value Auctions? Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, 
131-148. 
19. Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and James Walker. 1982. "Auction Market 
Theory of Heterogeneous Bidders." Economics Letters, 9:319-325. 
20. Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and James Walker. 1983a. "Tests of 
Heterogeneous Bidders: Theory of First Price Auctions." Economics Letters, 12: 207-
212. 
21. Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and James Walker. 1985b. "Experimental 
Development of Sealed Bid Auction Theory:  Calibrating Controls for Risk 
Aversion." American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 75: 160-165. 
22. Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and James Walker. 1988. “Theory and 
Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1: 61-
99. 
23. Cox, James C., Smith, Vernon L., and James Walker. 1992. “Theory and 
Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment.”American Economic Review, 82(5): 
1392-1412. 
24. Dodonova, A., and  Khoroshilov, Y. (2004). Anchoring and Transaction Utility: 
Evidence from On-line Auctions. Applied Economics Letters, 11 (5), 307–310. 
25. Dorsey, R and Razzolini, L (2003): “Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions 
Using Controlled Lotteries”, Experimental Economics, 6: 123-140. 
26. Durham, Y., Roelofs, M. and S. Standifird (2004): eBay’s Buy-it-Now Function: 
Who, When and How, Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy 4, 1-22. 
137 
 
27. Ellsberg, D. 1961."Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75: 643-669. 
28. Filiz-Ozbay, Emel and Erkut Ozbay. 2007. “Auctions with Anticipated Regret: 
Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review, 97(4): 1407-1418.  
29. Fox, C.R. and Amos Tversky. 1995. "Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative 
Ignorance," Quarterly J. Economics, 110, 585-603. 
30. Fox, C.R. and Amos Tversky. 1998. “A Belief-Based Account of Decision under 
Uncertainty”, Management Science, 44(7), 879-895  
31. Friedman, Daniel. 1992. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: 
Comment.” American Economic Review, 82(5): 1374-1378. 
32. Garratt, Rod and Thomas Troger. 2003 “Speculation in Second-Price Auctions 
with Resale,” working paper,  
33. Gilboa, I. 1987. “Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive 
Probabilities”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16, 65-88. 
34. Gilboa, I and D. Schmeidler. 1989. “Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique 
prior”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153. 
35. Goeree, Jacob K., Holt, Charles A. and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2002. “Quantal 
Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Induced Value Auctions.” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 104(1): 247–72. 
36. Gonzalez, Richard and George Wu. 1999. “On the Shape of the Probability 
Weighting Function”, Cognitive Psychology, 38, 129–166. 
37. Greene, William H. 2003: Econometric Analysis, 5th edition. 
138 
 
38. Guerre, Emmanuel, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. 2000. “Optimal Non-
parametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions.” Econometrica, 68: 525-74.  
39. Gul, Faruk. 1991. “A Theory of Disappointment Aversion.” Econometrica, 59(3): 
667-686. 
40. Haile, Philip. 2001. “Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest 
Service Timber Sales.” American Economic Review, 91:399-427. 
41. Harrison, G.W. (1989): Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions, American 
Economic Review, Volume 79, No. 4, 749-762. 
42. Harrison, G.W. (1992): Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment, 
American Economic Review, Vol.82, No.5, 1426-1443. 
43. Harrison, Glenn W. and John A. List. 2004. “Field Experiments.” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 42: 1009-1055. 
44. Harstad, Ronald M. 2000. “Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidder’s Experience 
with Pricing Rules.” Experimental Economics, 3: 261-280. 
45. Hertwig, R., Weber, E. U., Barron, G., and I. Erev. 2004. “Decisions from 
experience and the effects of rare events in risky choices”. Psychological Science, 15, 
534–539. 
46. Horowitz, John K. and Kenneth E. McConnell. 2002. “A Review of WTA/WTP 
Studies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 426-447. 
47. Isoni, Andrea, Loomes, Graham and Robert Sugden. 2008. “The Willingness to 
Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect”, Subject Misconceptions, 
and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment” working paper, 
School of Economics, University of East Anglia. 
139 
 
48. Jaskow, Paul L., Schmalensee, Richard and Elizabeth M. Bailey. 1998, “the 
market for Sulphur Dioxide Emisssions.” The American Economic Review, Vol 88, 
No.4, 669-685. 
49.  Kagel, John H. 1995. “Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research (Ch. 7)” In 
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 
501–85. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
50. Kagel, John H., and Alvin E. Roth. 1992. “Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price 
Auctions: Comment.” American Economic Review, 82(5): 1379–91. 
51. Kagel, John N. and Ronald M. Harstad, and Dan Levin. 1987. “Information 
Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Induced Values: A 
Laboratory Study.” Econometrica, 55(6): 1275-1304. 
52. Kagel, John N. and Dan Levin. 1993. “Independent Induced Value Auctions: 
Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second-, and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers 
of Bidders.” Economic Journal, 103: 868-79. 
53. Kahneman, D and Amos Tversky. 1979.  “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision making under Risk.” Econometrica, 47(2): 263-292. 
54. Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1990. 
“Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(6): 1325–48. 
55. Kalyanaram, G., and Winer, R. S. (1995). Empirical Generalizations from 
Reference Price Research, Marketing Science, 14 (3), G161–G169. 
140 
 
56. Kamins, M. A., Dr`eze, X., and Folkes, V. S. (2004). Effects of Seller-Supplied 
Prices on Buyers’ Product Evaluations: Reference Prices in an Internet Auction 
Context. Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (4), 622–628. 
57. Karlan, Dean. 2005. “Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and 
Predict Financial Decisions.” American Economic Review, 95(5): 1688-1699. 
58. Kilka, Michael and Martin Weber. 2001. “What Determines the Shape of the 
Probability Weighting Function under Uncertainty?” Management Science, 47(12): 
1712-1726. 
59. Klemperer, Paul. 2004. “Auctions: Theory and Practice.” Princeton University 
Press. 
60. Klibanoff, Peter, Marinacci, Massimo and Sujoy Mukerji. 2005. “A smooth 
model of ambiguity aversion”. Econometrica, 73(6): 1849-1892. 
61. Knetsch, Jack L. 1989. “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible 
Indifference Curves.” American Economic Review, 79(5): 1277-84.  
62. Knetsch, Jack L., Richard H. Thaler, Daniel Kahneman, 1991. “Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives , 5 (1): 193-206.  
63. Köszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “A Model of Reference-Dependent 
Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4): 1133-1166.  
64. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. 1995. “Econometrics of 
First Price Auctions.” Econometrica, 63: 953-980. 
65. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Quang Vuong. 1996. “Structural Analysis of Auction 
Data.” American Economic Review, 86: 414-420. 
141 
 
66. Lange, Andreas and Anmol Ratan. 2010. “Multidimensional Reference-Dependent 
Preferences in Sealed Bid Auctions: How (most) laboratory experiments differ from 
the field” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 68(2), 634-645. 
67. Lee, H. 1998: "Do electronic marketplace lower the price of goods?"Communications 
of the ACM, Vol. 41, 78-85. 
68. Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007a. “What do Laboratory Experiments 
Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real world?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 21 (2): 153-174. 
69. Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007b. “Viewpoint: On the generalizability of 
lab behaviour to the field.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 40 (2): 347-370. 
70. List, John A. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1): 41-71. 
71. List, John A. 2004. “Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory: Evidence From 
the Marketplace.” Econometrica, 72(2): 615-625. 
72. Lucking-Reiley, David. 1999. “Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence 
Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet.” American Economic Review, 
89(5): 1063-80. 
73. Mathews, Timothy (2004): “The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-
out Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay’s Buy-it-Now Feature”, 
Journal of Economics, 81 (1), 25-52. 
74. Mathews, T and Katzman, B. (2004): The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an 
Auction with a Buyout Option, mimeo, California State University-Northridge. 
142 
 
75. Mazumdar, T., Raj, S. P., and  Sinha, I. (2005). Reference Price Research: Review 
and Propositions. Journal of Marketing, 69 (4), 84–102. 
76. Morgan, J., Steiglitz, K and Reis, G ( 2003): The Spite motive and Equilibrium 
Behavior in Auctions, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol.2, Issue 1, 
Article 5.  
77. Plott, Charles R. and Kathryn Zeiler. 2005. “The Willingness to Pay-Willingness 
to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental 
Procedures for Eliciting Valuations.” American Economic Review, 95: 530-545. 
78. Prelec, Drazen. 1998. “The Probability Weighting Function.” Econometrica, 66(3): 
497-527. 
79. Popkowski Leszczyc, P. T. L., Qiu, C., and  He, Y. (2007). Empirical Testing of the 
Reference Price Effect of Buy-now Prices in Internet Auctions. Working Paper, 
University of Alberta. 
80. Quiggin, John. 1982. “A Theory of Anticipated Utility.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 3: 323-343. 
81. Ratan, Anmol. 2008. “Reference-Dependent Preferences in First-Price Auctions.” 
Working Paper, University of Maryland.  
82. Reynolds, S.S. and Wooders, J. (2005): Auctions with a Buy Price at 
http://econ.arizona.edu/research/workingpapers.aspx 
83. Salo, Athia A. and Martin Weber. 1995. “Ambiguity Aversion in First-Price 
Sealed-Bid Auctions.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 11: 123-137.  
84. Sarin, Rakesh K, and Martin Weber. 1993. “Effects of Ambiguity in Market 
Experiments.” Management Science, 39(5): 602-615.  
143 
 
85. Schmalensee, Richard , Joskow, Paul L., Ellerman, A. Denny , Montero, Juan 
Pablo and Elizabeth M. Bailey. 1998. “An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide 
Emissions Trading.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 3, 53-68. 
86. Schmeidler, D. 1989. “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without 
Additivity”, Econometrica, 57, 571-587. 
87. Smith, Vernon L and James Walker. 1993. “Monetary Rewards and Bidding Cost 
in Experimental Economics.” Economic Inquiry, 31(2): 245-261. 
88. Smith, Vernon L and James Walker. 1993. “Rewards, Experience and Bidding 
Costs in First Price Auctions.” Economic Inquiry, 31(2): 237-244. 
89. Smith, Vernon L. 1965. “Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian 
Hypothesis.” Journal of Political Economy, 73:4: 387-393.  
90. Starmer, Chris. 2000. “Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The case for 
a descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk.” Journal of Economic Literature, 38(2): 
332-382. 
91. Sugden, Robert. 2003. “Reference-dependent subjective expected utility.” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 111: 172-191.  
92. Shunda, Nicholas (2009): Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-
dependent preferences, Games and Economic Behavior, 67(2), 645-664. 
93. Suter, T. A., and Hardesty, D. M. (2005). Maximizing Earnings and Price Fairness 
Perceptions in Online Consumer-to-Consumer Auctions. Journal of Retailing, 81 (4), 
307–317. 
94. Tversky, Amos  and Daniel Kahneman. 1986. “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Biddings.” Journal of Business, 59(4): S251-S278. 
144 
 
95. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: 
A Reference-Dependent Model.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4): 1039–61. 
96. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 297-
323. 
97. Urbany, Joel E., Bearden, William O. and Dan C. Weilbaker.1988. “The Effect of 
Plausible and Exaggerated Reference Prices on Consumer Perceptions and Price 
Search”, The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jun., 1988), pp. 95-110 
98. Vickrey, William. 1961. “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed 
Tenders.” Journal of Finance, 16(1): 8–37. 
99. Wu, George and Richard Gonzalez. 1999. “Nonlinear decision weights in choice 
under uncertainty”, Management Science, 45, 74–85. 
